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Polygamy's Inscrutable
Criminal Mischief
SUSAN G. DRUMMOND*
The polygamy charges Laid in the settlement of Bountiful, British Columbia, in January 2009,
give rise to questions about the particular mischief of the polygamy offence in section 293
of Canada's Criminal Code. This article argues that, as a result of developments within
related areas of taw, potygamy's mischief under the current wording of the section is virtually
inscrutable. When used, this section has principally served as a mechanism to discipline so-
cialty and politically marginalized groups. Developments in family law over the last forty
years have generated a host of exceptions to the application of the polygamy section, in-
cluding religious marriage, unmarried cohabitation, and adulterous relationships.
Furthermore, the wording of the polygamy section hinges upon a key concept-conjugality-
which derives its meaning from family taw, and, in this domain, the concept of c6njugality has
degenerated to the point of unintelligibility. As a result, the targeted harm in the polygamy
provision is rendered vague. In its jurisprudential and social context, section 293 is un-
constitutional under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the
provision should be declared void for vagueness. The article presents alternatives to the
criminatization of polygamy in order to address concerns about the vulnerabilities of
women and children living within oppressive polygamous relationships.
Les accusations de polygamie port6es en janvier 2009 dans le r6gtement de [a cause Boun-
tiful, en Cotombie-Britannique, soutlvent des questions sur l'infraction particuli~re du
m~fait de ta potygamie en vertu de 'article 293 du Code criminel du Canada. Cet article fait
valoir qu' ta suite de d6veloppements intervenus dans des domaines Li6s , ta l6gislation,
te m6fait de Ia potygamie en vertu du libell6 actuet de tarticte est virtueltement impossible
6 d6finir. Lorsqu'on y recourt, cet article a essentietlement servi de m6canisme visant h
prendre des mesures disciplinaires envers des groupes marginatis6s aux plans social et
politique. Les d~vetoppements en droit de ta familte au cours des quarante derni~res an-
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I wish to express my gratitude to Professors
Bruce Ryder, Mary Jane Mossman, and Angela Campbell for providing detailed commentary
and feedback on an earlier version of this article. I am also grateful to my colleagues at
Osgoode Hall Law School for actively engaging with a presentation of the article at a faculty
seminar and providing stimulating debate on the topic. Professor Jamie Cameron provided
an outstanding first editorial review of the article, and this was followed by the scrupulous
editorial advice of Professor Benjamin Richardson and the Osgoode Hall Law Journal's
Editorial Board. It is a real privilege to have such attentive and professional readers.
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noes ont engendr6 une myriade d'exceptions quant L'application de Varticle sur [a polygamie,
y compris Le mariage religieux, L'union de fait et les relations adult~res. En outre, le libe[l
de l'article sur [a polygarnie s'articule autour d'un concept c16 - .e lien conjugal - qui tire sa
signification du droit de [a farnille et, en ce domaine, ce concept du lien conjugal a d~gn~r6
jusqu'au point de 'ininteltigibilit6. Par cons6quent, le prejudice cibl6 par La disposition sur
[a polygamie est devenu vague. Dans son contexte jurisprudentiel et social, larticle 293 est
inconstitutionnel en vertu de [article 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libert6s, et [a
disposition devrait tre d6clar6e nulle en raison de son imprecision. L'article pr6sente des
solutions de rechange 6 La criminalisation de La poLygarnie, afin d'aborder les preoccupa-
tions relatives 6 [a vuln6rabilit6 des femmes et des enfants qui vivent au sein de relations
polygames abusives.
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THE LEGAL HISTORY1 PRECEDING the polygamy charges2 that were laid in the
settlement of Bountiful, British Columbia, against two men--both members
and leaders of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day
Saints (FLDS)-in January 2009, have already stimulated a re-evaluation of how
Canada conceives, and should conceive, legitimate intimacy and the legitimate
family. The -fact that the charges were dropped on 23 September 2009-leaving
the men free to go--has left a puzzling .disjuncture between the law on the
books and the practical law, which is no less a stimulant, about where we stand in
1. For a good synopsis of this history, see Blackmore v. British Columbia (Attorney General),
[20091 B.C.J. No. 1890 at para. 7ff [Blackmorel.
2. See Robert Maras & Wendy Stueck, "Polygamy Charges in Bountiful" The Globe andMail
(7 January 2009), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/article
963758.ece>.
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Canada with regard to the status of polygamy.3 This disjuncture will be further
pronounced: the most foreseeable outcome of the decision to quash the charges
will be a constitutional reference to the British Columbia Court of Appeal to
determine whether or not the polygamy section can withstand Charter scrutiny.
Blackmore v. British Columbia makes it clear that the 2007 reasoning of
Richard Peck, QC (the first special prosecutor assigned by Wally Opal, the
Attorney General of British Columbia), was final, and ought not to have been
second and third guessed by the appointment of subsequent special prosecutors
who, for all appearances, were assigned to increase the chances of the Attorney
General getting a prosecutorial recommendation that was more closely aligned
with his wishes.4 Peck was clear that the prospects of a prosecution that would
secure a conviction were very uncertain as a result of the conflict of the polygamy
section with the freedom of religion section of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.' Given the years of uncertainty generated by the opinions of not
only three prosecutors, but also by the "lengthy passage of time since the first
expression of police interest in Bountiful, and the existence of prior Crown
opinions regarding the constitutionality of s. 293,"' Peck felt strongly that the
public interest would be best served by "an authoritative and expeditious judicial
resolution of the legal controversy surrounding polygamy."7
As the prosecutorial history in British Columbia strongly suggests, the
current formulation of section 293-the polygamy section-is constitutionally
inadequate. Under the circumstances, a call for Parliament to revisit the offence
of polygamy de novo is not unlikely. Given the heated policy issues on both
sides of the polygamy debate, this article takes the current moment of calm.be-
fore the next storm to gain a new understanding of the relationship between the
state and religious minorities (in addition to other norm-generating communities).
In light of the Bountiful polygamy charges, and a foreseeable constitutional
reference, Canada may find itself facing the stark reality of how Canadian family
and intimate life has been shaped over the last forty years (i.e., since the Divorce
3. Blackmore, supra note 1.
4. Ibid. at para. 88ff.
5. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(a), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 Charter].
6. Blackmore, supra note 1 at para. 20.
7. Ibid. at para. 21.
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Act (1968) 8 and Prime Minister Trudeau's ushering of the state from the bed-
rooms of the nation's consenting adults'). It may find that the sociological,
jurisprudential, and legislative shifts during this period have placed Parliament
in such a position that it cannot identify a specific mischief in the polygamy
section that is not simultaneously permitted elsewhere in law.
Given the religious background of the accused men, and that their faith has
already figured so prominently in the public stance taken up by the defence,"0 the
charges should stimulate far more than a review of the role played by polygamous
relationships within the growing diversity of legitimate Canadian family structures.
The minority religio-cultural dimension of the Bountiful cases will gain even
more attention, precisely because of polygamy's inscrutable criminal mischief.
In light of the vagueness and overbreadth of the current legislation in this
area, I argue that the state has left itself free to launch a "standardless sweep,""
driven by the predilections of law enforcement officials. These predilections appear
to have brought religious minorities, particularly Fundamentalist Mormons,
within their sights.
The vociferous crowd that exhorted the Attorney General of British Columbia
to pursue the Bountiful prosecutions was convinced that, whether or not there is a
deep harm associated with polygamy in and of itself, the relational arrangement is
a Gordian knot that is inextricably tangled with very grave social harms, such as
the sexual exploitation of-and sexual interference with-minors, the marriage of
underage children to adults, and the subjugation and oppression of women. 2 In
8. Divorce Act, S.C. 1967-68, c. 24 [Divorce Act (1968)].
9. Pierre Trudeau, "There's No Place for the State in the Bedrooms of the Nation" CBC
Television News (broadcast 21 December 1967) in CBC Digital Archives, "Trudeau's
Omnibus Bill: Challenging Canadian Taboos," online:
<http:l/archives.cbc.calpoliticslrights_
freedoms/topics/538/>.
10. "Bountiful Leader calls Polygamy Charge 'Religious Persecution"' CBCNews.ca (8 January
2009), online: <http:/lwww.cbc.calcanadalbritish-columbialstory/2009/OllO8/bc-polygamy-
winston-blackmore.html>.
11. This is the language of one of the leading cases on laws held to be void for vagueness. See
Reference re ss. 193 and 195. 1 (1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 at
para. 41 [Prostitution Reference].
12. See Daphne Bramham, The Secret Lives of Saints: Child Brides and Lost Boys in Canada's
Polygamous Mormon Sect (Toronto: Random House, 2008) [Bramham, The Secret Lives].
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this climate of generalized anxiety about possible misconduct in the Bountiful
community, it is important to point out that not a single charge has been laid
for these latter harms, only two of which--sexual exploitation and sexual inter-
ference-constitute criminal offences.
13
If evidence exists that men in Bountiful have sexually exploited or interfered
with young people, charges should be laid under the aforementioned sections of
the Criminal Code. The religious background of the defendants is irrelevant to
the validity of these charges. Religious freedom, protected under section 2(a) of
the Constitution Act, 1982,14 does not extend to the protection of religious prac-
tices that harm the integrity of young people in this particularly pernicious way.
However, none of the three special prosecutors that the Attorney General hired
(one after the other) to ferret out evidence of crimes and misdemeanors in
Bountiful uncovered sufficient evidence to prosecute."5 As defence counsel
shrewdly elected to proceed with a trial in the Superior Court of British Co-
lumbia, 16 the Crown was precluded from going on a fishing expedition for
more evidence of alleged lateral offences through a preliminary inquiry."
I will leave the argument of whether or not the subjugation and oppression
of women should be a criminal offence to those more ideologically driven than
myself. However, the other tangle in polygamy's Gordian knot-underage
marriage-is not a criminal offence in Canada. Furthermore, in the area of civil
law, "the state of this law is deplorable,"' 8 and has left federal common law to de-
termine the age of consent to marriage. This antiquated body of law permits
13. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 153 (as amended by R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.),
s. 1; 2005, c. 32, s. 4; 2008, c. 6, s. 54) [Criminal Code].
14. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 2(a), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[Constitution Act, 1982]. See also Charter, supra note 5, s. 2(a).
15. See e.g. Richard C.C. Peck, QC, Report of the Special Prosecutorfor Allegations of Misconduct
Associated with Bountiful, BC: Summary of Conclusions, online: <http://www.canada.com/
vancouversun/news/extras/bountiful.pdf>.
16. See Daphne Bramham, "Accused Polygamist to Use Gay-marriage Laws as Defence: Case
Held Over Until Feb. 18 as Lawyers Gather Evidence" Canada.com (22 January 2009),
online: <http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=1 2 02 730>.
17. Such an inquiry might be conducted in part by calling women and other members of the
community to testify under oath about any evidence relevant to the presumed harms of
polygamy.
18. See Simon R. Fodden, Essentials of Canadian Law: Family Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999)
at 20.
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Canadian children to marry at age seven 1 -- the marriage being merely voidable
until the age of twelve for girls and fourteen for boys, after which point it becomes
fully valid.2' As a result of these various disqualifications, polygamy, in and of
itself, remained the focus of criminal inquiry in the Bountiful cases, effectively
disentangled from the other presumed knots of criminal intrigue such as under-
age marriage, and sexual exploitation and interference.
In this article, I argue that the mischief in the Criminal Code's polygamy
section is inscrutable to the reasonable person with ordinary powers of discern-
ment. Such powers are informed by a mundane immersion in the complex social
norms and debates that relate to the intimate and familial life that has emerged
since the late 1960s. Polygamy's mischief is also inscrutable to those with more
focused lenses, who are trained to discern the intelligibility that emerges out of the
more rarified and picayune normativity of both common law and statute. The
meaning of the polygamy section, for both amateur and expert audiences, is vague.
Beyond being merely vague in legal and social import, however, the provision
itself is vague, and it should therefore be declared "void for vagueness" in con-
junction with section 7 of the Charter."
The concept of conjugality is the most credible fulcrum on which to hinge
the intelligibility of the polygamy section. This provision places in jeopardy
everyone who enters into "any kind of conjugal union with more than one person
at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of mar-
riage."22 This concept of conjugal union appears broad enough to include those
who are civilly married, those who are religiously, culturally, or customarily
bound to each other, those who are intimately connected with each other, and
those who are otherwise cohabiting in a spouse-like relationship.
However, the polygamy section has to be examined in the context of the
Canadian legal system as a whole. I argue that both case law and statutes--in
19. This is the law for children in the common law provinces of Canada. The Federal Law -
Civil Law Harmonization Act changed the law for Quebec alone, so that the minimum age
for marriage in Quebec is now sixteen. See Federal Law - Civil Law Harmonization Act, No.
1, S.C. 2001, c. 4 , s. 6.
20. Fodden, supra note 18 at 20. See also Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law in Canada:
Cases and Commentary (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2004) at 82; Berend Hovius, Family
Law: Cases, Notes and Materials, 6th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 131.
21. Charter, supra note 5, s. 7.
22. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
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family law, in cognate areas of the criminal law, and under the polygamy section
itself--have carved significant chunks of intelligibility out of any intuitive
meaning of conjugality for the purposes of the polygamy provision. Whatever
intelligibility remains is problematically vague for the criminal law.
I will demonstrate that this jurisprudential evisceration of possible readings of
polygamy leaves the section with a fraught history of persecution against social,
political, and religious minorities, while leaving its residual definitional con-
tent---conjugality--devoid of a specific meaning. The jurisprudential concept of a
conjugal (or spouse-like) relationship in family law has degenerated to the extent
that it fails to provide sufficient interpretive guidance for anticipating when one is
in such a relationship, or how one can avoid such a situation---an affliction that is
troubling in family law, and fatal to the criminal law. The common law definition
of conjugal union has no essential elements. Conjugal unions do not need to be
sexual in nature to exist, and the parties to a conjugal union do not need to share a
residence, pool domestic tasks and assets, or have generated a social perception of
conjugality. The cluster of marriage-like features is intentionally flexible, and
judges are left to an "I know it when I see it approach."23
As a result of major shifts in values within family law, the polygamy offence
no longer coincides with the contemporary substratum of values about family
and sexuality, which have emerged over the last forty years in Canadian law and
society. The relevance offormaf' conjugality--triggered by marriage, extinguished
by divorce, and shielded in between by privacy--has been turned inside-out by
the sociological and legal significance of functional conjugality. For the latter
23. This point is made in Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, "What is Marriage-Like Like? The
Irrelevance of Conjugality" (2001) 18 Can. J. Fam. L. 269 at 299 [Cossman & Ryder,
"Marriage-Like"]. I return to this article below in the discussion about the meaning of
"conjugality."
24. By formal, I mean state-generated (i.e., civil) marriage.
25. To track developments in this direction, see Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, "The Legal
Regulation of Adult Personal Relationships: Evaluating Policy Objectives and Legal Options
in Federal Legislation" (Originally prepared for the Law Commission of Canada, 1 May
2000), online: <http://dalspacel.library.dal.ca/dspace/bitstream/handle/10222/10259/
CossmanRyder%o20Research%/o2ORegulation%/o20Adult /o20Relationships/o20EN.pdfseque
nce= 1>; Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, "Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and
Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships" (Originally prepared for the Law
Commission of Canada, 21 December 2001), online: <http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/
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construct, the content of intimate and familial relationships has become an
alternate focus of legal scrutiny. Meanwhile, the contemporary range of sexual
and familial diversity deprives finctional conjugality of the bright-line coherence
that it might have once had in an era where the range of 'normal' families was
quite narrow. Conjugality itself appears to be collapsing into uncertainty and
incoherence in its most familiar domain: family law.26 These parallel develop-
ments in the socio-legal conceptions of family and intimacy have outpaced a
polygamy offence that has been virtually unused since the first Criminal Code of
1892. As a result, the polygamy offence has collapsed into the disintegrating
concept of conjugality, rendering the harm that it targets all the more inscrutable.
Taking into account all of these statutory and jurisprudential understandings
of what constitutes a "form of marriage,"27 "any form of polygamy,"28 and "any
kind of conjugal union, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form
of marriage,"29 it becomes virtually impossible to articulate what the criminal
conception of bigamy or polygamy amounts to, and what the core mischief is
that underlies it. It also becomes virtually impossible for the provisions to provide
fair notice that particular conduct falls within the scope of the offence. Thus,
criminal law is the wrong instrument for addressing worries about the vulnerabili-
ties of women and children within plural family arrangements. As the final section
of this article demonstrates, these legitimate anxieties about women and children
can be addressed through a plethora of alternative regulatory means, none of
which assail fundamental principles of justice entrenched in the constitution.
I. CHARTER TROUBLE: VOID FOR VAGUENESS
With the polygamy section left as the only possible offence under which the
accused. men in the Bountiful cases were subject to conviction, deciphering its
specific harm would have become the central preoccupation of not just the parties
involved in the cases, but the general public as well. A constitutional reference
will further.remove the polygamy provision from the factual nexus in any par-
beyondconjugality.pdf>. For a reference to the discussion surroundingfiinctional conjugality,
see Cossman & Ryder, "Marriage-Like," supra note 23.
26. Ibid.
27. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
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ticular community, bringing the Charter issues to the forefront. Deciphering
the harm in polygamy will thus demand a broader order of inquiry-beyond
the community of Bountiful-and the Crown will be compelled to locate the
pressing and substantial objective that drives the legislation. This objective must
be one that is capable of overriding a variety of human rights that are at stake in
the prosecutions.
The approach most likely to succeed will be rooted in the claim that section
293 of the Criminal Code violates the right to religious freedom that is guaranteed
by section 2(a) of the Charter.3" This, indeed, has been the recurrent response of
the Crown and special prosecutors in British Columbia with regard to the main
hurdles in laying charges in the Bountiful context. A challenge to section 293
under section 7 of the Charte?1 (the right to life, liberty, and security of person)
is thought by some legal scholars to be less powerful.32 It is suggested that such
a challenge would focus on the liberty interest in section 7, as it engages with
civil law-specifically with the civil definition of marriage. The Supreme
Court of Canada (SCC) has found that liberty is infringed when the law prevents
a person from making "fundamental personal choices."33 The right to choose
whom one marries would be such a paradigmatic, fundamental personal choice.
Under this argument, the liberty to marry both religiously and polygamously
is broad enough to capture the Bountiful situation, but broader, perhaps,
than is necessary for those particular cases. The liberty right guaranteed under
section 7 may be more fitting for an independent challenge to the civil defi-
nition of marriage that is specified in the Civil Marriage Act.3" The latter
defines marriage, for civil purposes, as "the lawful union of two persons to the
exclusion of all others."3"
30. See Martha Bailey et al., "Explaining Recognition of Foreign Polygamous Marriages: Policy
Implications for Canada" in Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social Implications for Women
and Children -A Collection of Policy Research Reports (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada,
2005) at 19, online: <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/lOO/200/301/swccfc/polygamye/pdf/200511-
0662420683_e.pdf> [Polygamy in Canada].
31. Charter, supra note 5, s. 7.
32. Bailey et al., supra note 30 at 30. See also Nicholas Bala, "An International Review of Polygamy:
Legal and Policy Implications for Canada" in Polygamy in Canada, supra note 30 at 39.
33. Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 at paras. 49-54
(and cases cited therein).
34. S.C. 2005, c. 33, s. 2 [Civil Marriage Act].
35. Ibid. For this s. 7 Charter analysis, see Bailey et al., supra note 30.
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There is another very compelling section 7 argument available-one, I believe,
that is fatal for the constitutionality of section 293 of the Criminal Code. It can
be argued that the polygamy offense is both vague (void for uncertainty) and
overbroad, and is therefore a fundamentally unjust violation of the liberty right
in section 7 of the Charter. Given that a conviction pursuant to section 293 can
lead to imprisonment for up to five years, this section carries a far graver threat
to liberty than state interference with fundamental personal choices. The
Criminal Code provisions relating to polygamy, already problematically drafted
in 1892, have not kept pace with the effects of federal divorce law since 1968,
with the socio-legal changes in the structure of the family, and with other
developments within criminal law. In the language of R. v. Nova Scotia Phar-
maceutical Societ/6 (another leading case on the void for vagueness doctrine),
the "substratum of values"37 that underlies legal enactments and provides the
substantive content of fair notice has shifted considerably over the last forty
years. The polygamy provision is no longer coincident with that substratum. It is
now almost impossible for citizens to foresee what conduct they must avoid in
order to remain beyond the reach of section 293. Where citizens are potentially
liable to having their liberty deprived, such reasonable foreseeability is critical to
ensuring that deprivations of liberty are in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.38
In particular, the SCC has established that a vague law offends the principles
of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter because:
[i]t is essential in a free and democratic society that citizens are able, as far as is pos-
sible, to foresee the consequences of their conduct in order that persons be given fair
notice of what to avoid, and that the discretion of those entrusted with law enforcement
is limited by clear and explicit legislative standards. ... This is especially important in
the criminal law, where citizens are potentially liable to a deprivation of liberty if
their conduct is in conflict with the law.
39
The difficulty with the ways in which the current Criminal Code provi-
sions have been interpreted, and the ways in which they have interacted with
or been overtaken by developments in private law, has precluded reasonable
36. [19921 2 S.C.R. 606 [NS Pharmaceutical].
37. Ibid. at para. 48.
38. See Prostitution Reference, supra note 11 at para. 38.
39. Ibid. at para. 34.
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foresight of what can be considered to be legal and illegal behaviour with respect
to multiple partners.
The provisions on their own are astonishingly overbroad, referring to "any
form of polygamy" and "any kind of conjugal union whether or not it is by law
recognized as a binding form of marriage."4 For example, a party in the common
situation of living separate and apart from a civil spouse while waiting for a civil
divorce, but who begins to live with another spouse with whom he or she wants
to build a life, is captured by the provision. 1 Additional proof that the provision's
language is overbroad can be found in the radical dissonance between the pro-
claimed contemporary objective of the provision and its consequences.
Protecting the vulnerabilities of women and children is sometimes taken to be
the pressing and substantial objective that replaced the religiously discrimina-
tory objective in the Criminal Code when amendments were made to the
polygamy offence in the 1950s.42 Yet, not only is the net of this provision cast
broadly over a vast range of relationship configurations, it is calibrated to catch
"[e]very one" 3 who is in one of these forbidden relationships.
This concept of "[e]very one"" includes women in plural marriages. As has
been argued effectively elsewhere, " these women are in just as much jeopardy as
men, since they are also liable to spend up to five years in prison. This crimi-
nalization of their relationships renders them far less likely to come forward and
assert their rights under areas of law that do protect their vulnerabilities, such as
division of matrimonial property, spousal support, and child support.4
The excessive scope of the provision is a concern that is closely related to its
40. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
41. For the jurisprudential understanding of what makes a provision too broad, see R v. Heywood,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 761.
42. For the feminist argument, see Department of Justice Canada, Polygyny and Canada's
Obligations Under International Human Rights Law by Rebecca J. Cook & Lisa M. Kelly
(Ottawa: Family, Children and Youth Section, 2006); See also Bala, supra note 32.
43. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 293.
Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter
into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the
same time, ... is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years. [emphasis added]
44. Ibid.
45. See Bailey et al., supra note 30 at 17.
46. Ibid.
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potential vagueness. Both concerns form the basis of "the minimum standard for
the formal content of law demanded by principles of fundamental justice."47
Based on the criterion used by Justice Gonthier to hold a law as void for vague-
ness, the far-reaching polygamy provision may be determined to be "so devoid
of precision in [its] content that a conviction will automatically flow from the
decision to prosecute. '' 8 Thus, not only does this provision open the door to a
"standardless sweep," 9 it also opens the door for "law enforcement officials to
pursue their personal predilections.""
In the Prostitution Reference, Justice Lamer stresses that the doctrine does
not require absolute certainty in its formulation.5 Further, the doctrine "is not to
be applied to the bare words of the statutory provision, but, rather, to the
provision as interpreted and applied in judicial decisions." 2 The provision, in
other words, needs to be read in light of relevant case law. While no law can
meet the standard of absolute certainty, both the principle of fair notice to citizens
(particularly for criminal law, where individual liberty is in jeopardy) and that of
limiting the discretion of enforcement powers, however, strongly indicate that
the current polygamy section offends the principles of fundamental justice that
are set out in section 7 of the Charter. This is particularly so in light of a
massive shift in the substratum of values regarding family and sexuality since
the late 1960s--a substratum that is accessible to all Canadians who might
otherwise lack access to the technicalities of formal notice. Additionally, this
substratum provides the moral foreseeability of harm, and generates the sub-
stantive notice that, in turn, can inoculate legal enactmentn from claims of
arbitrariness.53 What remains, then, for the purposes of determining whether
47. Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, eds., The Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty Five
Years Later, 1 st ed. (Markham: LexisNexis, 2008) at 474.
48. NS Pharmaceutical, supra note 36 at para. 53.
49. Prostitution Reference, supra note 11 at para. 41. Both this danger and the next were critiqued
in Justice Lamer's disquisition on void for vagueness.
50. Ibid
51. Ibid. at para. 40.
52. Ibid. See also NS Pharmaceutical, supra note 36; Canadian Foundation for Children, -Youth
and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 [Canadian Foundation];
Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., 12007] 2 S.C.R. 610 [TI-Macdonald
Corp.]
53. NS Pharmaceutical, ibid. at para. 48.
DRUMMOND, POLYGAMY'S INSCRUTABLE MISCHIEF 329
the polygamy section falls afoul of the doctrine of void for vagueness, is a review
of how the provision and its embedded terms have been interpreted and applied
in judicial decisions.
Before examining this jurisprudential history, it is worth turning briefly to
the provision's socio-legal history. One of the features of a law that is void for
vagueness is that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. In
the case of the polygamy section, this concern seems particularly acute, given that
the provision was originally drafted in 1892 to target Fundamentalist Mormons, 5
that a disproportionate number of those convicted under the provision have been
Aboriginal men, and that public pressure to prosecute is mostly directed at reli-
gious minorities, including Muslims.
II. CIVIL VULNERABILITIES AND STANDARDLESS SWEEPS
The argument that section 293 is vague and overly broad is related to claims that
might be made with respect to religious freedom, and also to the argument that
the polygamy law discriminates on the ground of religious belief. Any criminal
law that is problematically vague or overbroad leaves socially and politically
marginalized groups vulnerable to a "standardless sweep"5 5 that might be driven
by the predilections of law enforcement officials. In light of their roots, this anxi-
ety seems particularly acute with respect to the polygamy laws.
The historical origins of the polygamy offence are rooted in ecclesiastical
policy, dating as far back as the thirteenth century, as part of the vision for society
that was seen by the religious faction that happened to be dominant when the
laws were promulgated. At the private law level, Canada entered Confederation
with a common law definition of marriage that was embedded in the very case
that was finally overturned in the recent flurry of same-sex marriage chal-
lenges.5 6 Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee,57 now constitutionally objectionable
54. Bala, supra note 32 at 28. To this effect, Bala states that:
Polygamy has been illegal in Canada since 1892. This provision was enacted in Canada as part of
the first Criminal Code, apparently as a result of American influences, as criminal laws were being
enacted about that time in the United States to prohibit the practice of polygamy by members of
the Mormon Church.
55. Prostitution Reference, supra note 11 at para. 41.
56. See Hendricks c. Qubec (Procureurghniral), [20021 Q.J. No. 3816 [Hendricks]; EGALE Canada
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] B.C. J. No. 994 (C.A.) [EGALE]; and Halpern v.
Toronto (City), [2003] O.J. No. 2268 (C.A.) [Halpern].
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for its restriction of marriage to one man and one woman, was, in fact, a case
about polygamy-the emphasis in the original case being on one man and one
woman. Hyde laid down for all Canadians the civil prohibition on the recognition
of polygamous marriages by clearly enunciating the presumed ecclesiastical motif
for all forms of legitimate marriage.5 8 This definition prevailed in Canada from
1866-2005, and the prohibition on plural unions for civil marriages is now
embedded in the Civil Marriage Act of 2005 (and separated from all reference
to religiosity).5 9
The very explicidy Christian context of Canadian family law is evident in the
civil understanding of polygamy and monogamy. The deliberate setting up of
religious minorities (and their conceptions of marriage) as outliers to the domi-
nant religious affiliation of the nascent state is evident from the fact that the
plaintiff in the Hyde case was a Mormon. Given that, in the words of the judge,
"the matrimonial law of this country is adapted to the Christian marriage,"" a
marriage under Mormon law was grouped in the same category as marriages
formed among "infidel nations" 61-- a formation beyond the collective pale.
Canadian anti-polygamy legislation arose directly out of cross-border pres-
sure from the American government to follow a set of statutory persecutions
enacted over a period of thirty years against fundamentalist Mormons. This was
an agenda, which, in the United States, was closely wed to a political and military
campaign against a secessionist movement in Utah that was led by the Mormon
founder, Joseph Smith. In response to the secessionist threat in Utah, the US
Congress began to pass legislation, starting with the Morill Act of 1 July 1862,
that was designed to outlaw bigamy and polygamy in the US Territories.62 The
Morill Act inaugurated successive encroachments on Mormon rights, which
eventually included the seizure of property and the deprivation of citizenship
57. [1866] 1 L.R.P. & D. 130 [Hyde].
58. Ibid. at 130 ("Marriage as understood in Christendom is the voluntary union for life of one
man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others" [emphasis added]).
59. Civil Marriage Act, supra note 34, s. 2 ("Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful union of
two persons to the exclusion of all others").
60. Hyde, supra note 57 at 135.
61. Ibid. at 134.
62. See Martha M. Ertman, "Race Treason: The Untold Story of America's Ban on Polygamy"
(University of Maryland, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-37, 26 March 2009) at 9,
n. 17, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1270023>.
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rights such as voting, holding office, and sitting on juries.63 The culmination of
a series of these statutes was the Edmunds- Tucker Act of 1887," which tightened
the evidentiary noose for successful prosecution.6" Shortly thereafter, the major-
ity sect of Mormons capitulated to federal government demands to forfeit
polygamy. On the other hand, the FLDS Mormons fled persecution in the
United States, and sought refuge in British Columbia and Alberta.
It should not be mistakenly assumed that the nineteenth century American
position on polygamy--as articulated in statute books, in the courts, and in pub-
lic debate-was about gender equality. Apart from the efforts by the federal
government to control what they regarded as treacherous Mormon claims to
political, economic, and social control of Utah in the late nineteenth century,
Martha Ertman has demonstrated that the government was just as preoccupied
with how white polygamists were engaged in race treason." Rejecting Mormon
claims that polygamy was protected as the free exercise of religion, Reynolds v.
United States67 (the leading anti-polygamy case from that era) notes that polygamy
was "odious among the northern and western nations of Europe ... almost
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people."68 Ertman
demonstrates how polygamy "provided the justification for the larger culture to
demote white Mormons from full citizenship on the grounds of racial inferiority"69
and, by an arsenal of such rhetorical devices, was used to forcefully thwart
Joseph Smith's aspirations to establish a separatist theocracy in Utah. As a
result, and under pressure from the Americans to criminalize Mormon polygamy,
the Canadian Parliament inserted a targeted clause in the polygamy provisions
in 1892. This clause was not removed from the Criminal Code until 1954."o
The racialized and politicized roots of the polygamy doctrine in both the
United States and Canada give pause to assertions that it can be invoked without
xenophobic taint. However, there are other socio-legal dimensions of the polyg-
63. Ibid
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
68. Ibid. at 164.
69. Ertman, supra note 62 at 5.
70. See Bailey etaL, supra note 30 at 23.
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amy law in Canada that suggest that it has been used as an instrument of colo-
nization (i.e., through the forceful restructuring of Aboriginal family
structures). Since 1892, there have only been a handful of such prosecutions
under the code's polygamy sections. One of the more salient of these was R. v.
Bear's Shin Bone,71 the 1899 case of a Blood Indian from the North West Ter-
ritories, Bear's Shin Bone, who was convicted under the polygamy section for
entering into simultaneous conjugal unions with two women.72 The marriages
were formed "Indian fashion,"73 meaning that "he promised to keep her all her
life, and she promised to stay with him, and that that was the way Indians
got married.""
Aboriginal customary law is itself plural and complex, reflecting the plethora
of practices engaged in by a diversity of First Nations. However, the concept of
marriages formed "Indian fashion," as articulated in Bear's Shin Bone, does not
belong to Aboriginal customary law, but rather to Aboriginal common law-a
body of law built on the middle ground of interactions between Aboriginal peoples
and the incoming settlers, and issuing from the common law courts of Canada.75
In the domain of family law, this body of mixed common law contains a fairly
narrow list of cases, and perhaps an even narrower (and increasingly narrowing)
conception of what constitutes customary marriage. The most recent of these
common law cases constitutionalizes customary marriage, and it does so in a way
that perpetuates the forceful restructuring of First Nations kinship structures that
were inaugurated with cases like Bear's Shin Bone.
What constitutes an "Indian marriage" is articulated in a manner that may
be ethnocentric and offensive to endogenous understandings of customary
marriage among Aboriginal peoples. However, it is worth reproducing for its
resonance with the contemporary widespread phenomenon of cohabitation.
Bear's Shin Bone relies on the following conception of "Indian marriage":
It is plain that among the savage tribes on this continent marriage is merely a natural
contract and that neither law, custom nor religion has affixed to it any conditions or
limitations or forms other than what nature has itself prescribed. ... Wherever mar-
71. (1899), 4 Terr. L.R. 173 [Bear's Shin Bone].
72 Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. R. v. Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka (1889), 1 Terr. L.R. 211 at 211 [Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka.
75. See Jeremy Webber, "Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative
Community Between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 623.
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riage is governed by no statute consent constitutes marriage and that consent is
shewn by their living together.
76
It is hard to suppress the sense that the marriage for which the judge in
Bone was convicting is closely commensurate with contemporary statutory
understandings of unmarried cohabitation. But this common law understanding
of Aboriginal marriage is not quite commensurate with cohabitation, as it
lacks the requirement (now set out in federal and provincial statutes) for a
qualifying period of living together (generally of one to three years), made
shorter by the birth of a child." An Aboriginal marriage under common law
criteria is more easily formed than unmarried cohabitation-something that
appears to make First Nations people more vulnerable to conviction under
the polygamy law.
The contemporary legal way to distinguish between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal cohabitation is via section 24 of the Constitution Act, 186778 and
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982."9 The former facilitates the creation of
a distinct marriage regime for Aboriginal people under the auspices of federal
jurisdiction, and the latter constitutionally protects persisting Aboriginal rights
from extinguishment or encroachment without due process and appropriate
justification. What might otherwise be functionally analogous to unmarried
cohabitation (i.e., living together constitutes consent and consent constitutes
marriage) can thereby be elevated for Aboriginal people to the constitutionally-
protected status of a customary marriage.
This constitutional security perversely appears to make Aboriginal people
particularly vulnerable under the polygamy section. This phenomenon provides
a cautionary tale about the availability of these deeply ambiguous provisions to
discipline socially and politically-marginalized groups in Canada. In light of these
arguments, harm to religious groups and minority communities becomes more
salient and poignant. The odour of religious persecution lingers over the offence,
particularly when conjoined with the ways in which it has been historically
directed or applied to socially and politically-marginalized groups.
76. Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka, supra note 74 at paras. 3, 6.
77. See e.g Family Law Act, RS.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 29 [Family Law Act] (providing the definition of
"spouse").
78. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 24, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II,
No. 5 [ Constitution Act, 1867]:
79. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 14, s. 35.
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III. FAMILY LAW'S SUBSTRATUM OF VALUES
Although the small handful of cases relating to the polygamy section itself provide
some clarity, Canada's polygamy cases have not single-handedly eliminated the
confusion surrounding the offence. The criminal law does not exist as a silo
that is separated from other areas of Canadian law. It has to be examined in the
context of the Canadian legal system as a whole. This approach is particularly
justified when a Criminal Code provision refers to a concept such as that of the
conjugal union-i.e., a concept that is otherwise not defined in the Criminal
Code, but has instead acquired its flesh and blood from developments within
family law. By eliminating some of the ways in which the polygamy section
might have been read, it should become clear that the legal construct of the
conjugal union has been left to do all of the polygamy offence's work (and it is
a construct that is, itself, precarious in law).
This section addresses the civil status of religious marriages, and how the
Divorce Act (1968) inaugurated a series of changes in the ways in which reli-
gious marriages must now be conceived-a conception that was inchoate within
Canadian conflict of laws rules. The Divorce Act (1968) changed the way that
provincial marriage acts must now be read, particularly with respect to religious
marriages. The interaction between these federal and provincial family laws shifts
the interpretive possibilities of the bigamy section in the Criminal Code. These
subtle transformations collectively have an impact on the meaning of the words
in the polygamy section and the scope of the jeopardy that it envisages. The
result of these shifts is that Canadian law tolerates informal (i.e., non-civil)
plural unions, as well the simultaneous existence of a civil marriage to one party
and a religious marriage to another.
Under the constitutional division of powers stemming from the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867,80 the federal Parliament has jurisdiction over marriage and
divorce. The provincial legislatures, however, under powers that relate to the
solemnization of marriage, retain the right to legislate the formal conditions for
the validity of marriage, such as how many witnesses are required, whether a
religious officiant can celebrate the marriage, and which ritual words must be
uttered in the creation of all valid civil marriages. Each province regulates these
formalities in its own marriage legislation. In addition, the provinces have
80. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 78.
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adopted a pluralistic model with respect to marriage officiants. Structured into
the rules of marriage solemnization is a facility that bestows religious officials
with the delegated authority-equal to that of civil bureaucrats-to create a
civil marriage simultaneously with a religious marriage. 8'
It is significant that any religious marriage ceremony that takes place before,
during, or after a civil solemnization is incidental and has no civil legal effect in
and of itself. These non-civil marriages are legal nullities in the eyes of Canadian
law. Celestial unions and marriages performed strictly according to Jewish,
Muslim, or Catholic law, for example, are legally irrelevant for the civil law,
independent of a coincident period of conjugal cohabitation. Canada's pluralism
in the domain of marriage law is distinguishable from the exclusively bureaucratic
model of civil marriage in jurisdictions such as France, which only allows civil
officials to create a valid civil marriage.
Beyond this pluralism in marriage formation in Canadian law, religious
celebration of marriage outside of civil solemnization is not prohibited. There is
no requirement in provincial marriage (solemnization) acts or in other Canadian
legislation that compels a religious community to nominate a civil officiant for
all marriages concluded within that community, or compels individual couples
within religious communities to get a civil marriage, The state has no say or
interest in what constitutes a religious marriage that does not have contact with
the civil law, nor with respect to who is qualified to perfect it. Canadian toler-
ance for religious marriages transacted outside of the civil marriage framework
can again be contrasted with jurisdictions such as France, which prohibit, with
penal sanctions, the celebration of a religious marriage prior or simultaneous to
civil solemnization. The French Code Penal, for example, stipulates that
[a] ny minister of religion who habitually conducts religious ceremonies of marriages
without being presented beforehand with the marriage certificate received by of-
ficials responsible for civil status is punished by six months' imprisonment and a
fine ofF7,500.
8 2
The tentative implication of these features of Canada's marriage solemnization
laws is that Canada defacto tolerates plural religious marriages within its territory.
This is partly a result of Canada's lack of a mechanism for the identification of
81. See e.g. Marriage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.3, s. 20 lMarriageAct].
82. Art. 433-21 C. pen., online: <http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=33&r=
3828>.
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informal plural unions, where the parties have never intersected with the state
in order to obtain a civil marriage. However, this pragmatic tolerance gets ele-
vated to a legal tolerance in the context of both the civil nullity of religious
marriage within Canada and Canada's conflict of laws rules that deal specifically
with plural non-civil unions.
The first conflict of laws rule deals with plural unions celebrated by reli-
gious communities within countries that do not permit polygamy. Such
arrangements are not recognized as valid foreign marriages under civil law.
However, no civil consequences will flow from such a ieligious ceremony.
83
Beyond plural religious marriages performed in other countries that prohibit
polygamy, private international law regards marriages celebrated in Canada "in
non-monogamous form without a preceding ceremony in accordance with
Canadian provincial law [as] ... nullit[ies]."" Canadian private international
law groups non-civil plural marriage with other forms of civilly meaningless
acts. They are as void ab initio as would be a marriage within the prohibited
degrees of consanguinity, 85 or as would have been a same-sex marriage prior to
the Civil Marriage Act 6 and the court of appeal decisions that sanctioned
same-sex marriages. 87
Under this logic, a plurality of such nullities also amounts to a nullity To
put the implications of the civil nullity of religious marriage succinctly, these
unions cross the threshold of potential criminal liability only in the polygamy
and bigamy sections of the Act, when they, as a matter of fact, coincide with
the status of unmarried cohabitation. Where a plurality of simultaneous reli-
gious marriages to different people might intuitively seem to constitute "any
form of polygamy"88 for the purposes of the polygamy section, the civil nullity
of religious marriage reduces the content of the first subsection of the polygamy
offence to little more than a tautological phrase: "[e]very one who enters into
83. See Bailey et.al., supra note 30 at 2.
84 Quresbi v. Quresbi, [19711 1 All E.R. 325. See also Jean-Gabriel Castel & Janet Walker,
Canadian Conflict of Laws, 6th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths Canada, 2005) vol.
2,s. 16.6.
85. Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act, S.C. 1990, c. 46, s. 2.
86. Civil Marriage Act, supra note 34.
87. Hendricks, supra note 56; EGALE, supra note 56; and Halpern, supra note 56.
88. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
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any form of polygamy commits the indictable offence of polygamy." 9 The
addition of "any form of polygamy"9 to the polygamy section adds nothing
that is not covered by "any kind of conjugal union"" in the second part of the
section. There are other parts of Canadian family law that confirm that reli-
gious marriages are not "forms of marriage" 2 or "conjugal unions"93 for the
purposes of bigamy and polygamy-namely, the interaction of the provincial
concept of a "lawful impediment to marriage"9 and the universal jurisdiction of
the Divorce Act (1968).
Beyond the registration requirements that enable religious authorities to
perform civil, marriages, the other key formality required to perfect a civil mar-
riage is the parties' certification that there is no lawful impediment to their
marriage. One such lawful impediment is a prior existing marriage. A person
must be unmarried at the time of the marriage ceremony.9" Further, in family
law, a bigamous marriage is void ab initio. As in a religious marriage, it carries no
civil consequences in and of itself.96 Only the first marriage has civil effect.
The absence of an existing marriage is one of the essential conditions of valid
marriage formation and, like the age of consent for marriage, it falls under
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., ss. 290, 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
93. Ibid., s. 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
94. I will be drawing on the Marriage Act to support my arguments that relate to lawful
impediments. See e.g. MarriageAct, supra note 81, s. 24(3).
In some part of the ceremony, in the presence of the person soleminzing the marriage and witnesses,
each of the parties shall declare: 'I do solemnly declare that I do not know of any lawful
impediment why 1, AB, may not be joined in matrimony to CD' ... and each of the parties shall
say to the other: 'I call upon these persons here present to witness that I, AB, do take you, CD,
to be my lawful wedded wife (or to be my lawful wedded husband or to be my lawful wedded
partner or to be my lawful wedded spouse).
95. Fodden, supra note 18 at 23.
96. That said, there are mechanisms in law that allow spouses who, in good faith, thought that
they were entering into a monogamous marriage to claim relief under provincial marital
property regimes. See Family Law Act, supra note 77, s. 1. They can also claim relief for
spousal support if their void marriage coincides with the requirements for unmarried
cohabitation. See Family Law Act, supra note 77, s. 29. Under this cohabitational umbrella,
they are also eligible for third party benefits such as health benefits, Canada Pensions Plan
benefits, and insurance claims. See the federal government's Modernization of Benefits and
Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c.12 and its provincial equivalents.
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Parliament's jurisdiction. It was not until 2005 that Parliament occupied its
jurisdictional authority to define marriage within the Civil Marriage Act,9
and, when it did, it apparently could not have made it clearer that Canadians
are permitted only one marriage at a time: "[m]arriage, for civil purposes, is
the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others."98 What re-
mains unclear about the Act is whether a prior existing religious marriage to
one person is a lawful impediment to a civil marriage to another, or
whether-consistent with the above analysis of religious marriages as nulli-
ties-it is only a prior existing civil marriage that precludes one from
marrying civilly.
The language of the Civil Marriage Act appears to quite self-consciously
leave that question alone. The Act explicitly restricts its scope to marriage "for
civil purposes."99 On the surface, the requirement for each spouse to solemnly
declare that he or she knows of no lawful impediment to the marriage would
seem to suggest that religiously married spouses must declare the latter as a lawful
impediment to civil marriage. The prohibition against bigamous marriage in
the Civil Marriage Act appears to be reinforced in the criminal prohibition on
bigamous marriage under section 290 of the Criminal Code, which makes it an
offence for anyone who, being married, goes through any other "form of mar-
riage""' with another person. Surely, a religious marriage is a form of marriage,
even if, as a civil nullity, it does not rise to the status of a civil marriage. If any-
thing creates a lawful impediment to a civil marriage, it would have to be a
status that has the capacity to transform a civil marriage into a criminal act.
Despite this intuitive understanding, the prevailing interpretation of "lawful
impediment," read against the bigamy section in the Criminal Code and the
way that the Divorce Act (1968)1' has been jurisprudentially glossed, suggests
97. Civil Marriage Act, supra note 34.
98 Ibid., s. 2. This provision overturned, at the national level, the antecedent common law
definition of marriage in Hyde, supra note 57, that, as noted above, defined marriage as "the
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others" (at 130).
The few other sentences in the Civil Marriage Act are preambular or clarificatory, and not
substantive.
99. Civil Marriage Act, ibid.
100. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 290.
101. The DivorceAct (1968) was followed by the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 7
lDivorceAct (1985)], which remains in force. The latter changed important parts of Canada's
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that the civil prohibition on bigamy in the Civil Marriage Act only applies to
multiple civil marriages.
The bigamy section clearly distinguishes "marriage12 from "forms of
marriage.""0 3 Marriage sim pliciter is civil marriage. The use of the unqualified
words "being married" in the first clause of the section"' (as distinct from
"forms of marriage" in the second clause0 5) implies that being married
means being civilly married. Once bestowed with the official status of civil
marriage, the state does not permit that status to be muddied with any other
marriage. The prohibition applies to protect the status of a pre-existing civil
marriage by prohibiting subsequent formal or informal marriages. This se-
quence is salient.
This argument about the clarity of civil status is an intuitive way of under-
standing the mischief in bigamy, as opposed to polygamy. Polygamy is intended
to capture the situation of having more than one spouse-or being in a conjugal
union with more than one person-simultaneously. The bigamy provisions, on
the other hand, speak to the offence of participating in a ceremony of marriage
while already civilly married.0 6 A bigamous marriage is also a polygamous
marriage, while the reverse is not necessarily true. The distinct nature of the
bigamy provisions (relating to clarity of status) would be redundant without
both the sequential dimension and the first reference to "being married" in
the section signifying civil marriage. This understanding of the import of the
bigamy section needs to be read congruently with how the Divorce Act (1968)
has modified what constitutes a lawful impediment to a civil marriage, as well
as with the type of relationship that the state adopted with religious family
law thereafter.
While Canada has always adopted a pluralistic law of marriage formation,
it does not permit any means of dissolving a civil marriage other than through
divorce regime, but left in place the state's universal jurisdiction over divorce, which was first
announced in the 1968 Act and is elaborated upon in this article.
102. "Every one commits bigamy who ... being married, goes through a form of marriage with
another person." Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 290.
103. Ibid
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid
106. See Angela Campbell, "Bountiful Voices" (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ. 183.
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the actions of a civil official-a judge.10 7 When Parliament assumed its jurisdiction
under section 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867, it exhausted the field of a
national divorce regime with the Divorce Act (1968)."' Canada does not dif-
ferentiate distinct communities to be organized under discrete principles of
religious law or community law without access to the civil benefits and rights
enjoyed by ordinary citizens. Canada's divorce legislation is universal, and this
has implications for civil bigamy, as well as for the bigamy and polygamy provi-
sions of the Criminal Code.
Soon after the Divorce Act (1968) was enacted, Canadian courts had to deal
with the legal consequences of its universal jurisdiction. One of the earliest
cases, Morris v. Morris,1"9 dealt with the scenario of Jewish agunot (bound women).
Talmudic law requires the husband to give his wife a bill of divorce and for her
to receive it. Sometimes, however, a husband may refuses to give this bill to his
wife, and this leaves her bound in marriage.11 While the case refers to the
predicament of civilly-divorced Jewish women who remain religiously married,
it also captures the predicament of civilly-divorced Catholic spouses who
remain indissolubly bound in a religious marriage. One of the majority judges,
arguing against the civil enforceability of religious marriages, speculated in the
following manner:
Suppose ... that a Catholic wife sought to resist her Catholic husband's petition
for divorce on the ground that, having been married according to the Catholic
faith, their marriage should be regarded as indissoluble. Such a plea would consti-
tute a challenge to the authority of the court in divorce matters. It would represent
an attempt to displace the general divorce law by the law of a particular religion. A
plea of that kind would, of course, not be effective to prevent the court from ap-
plying the general law.
111
As an aspect of the "exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of
Canada [which] extends to ... Marriage and Divorce""' 2 (bestowed by section
107. Divorce Act (1985), supra note 101, s. 7 ("The jurisdiction conferred on a court by this Act to
grant a divorce shall be exercised only by a judge of the court without a jury").
108. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 78, s. 91(26).
109. Morris v. Morris (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 550 (Man. C.A.) [Morris].
110. For a description of the issue and a list of references to Jewish divorce law, see Bruker v.
Marcovitz, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607.
111. Ibid. at para. 31.
112. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 78, s. 91(26).
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91 of the Constitution Act, 1867), the potentially conflicted co-existence of state
and Catholic law is resolved by rendering the latter civilly ineffective, so that it
dwells outside of the penumbra of "official" '113 law.
If Catholic family law (which prohibits divorce) retained its legal force
vis-ti-vis Canadian family law, the exclusive ability of the Canadian Parlia-
ment to create a single divorce regime for all Canadians would inevitably be
compromised. The language of the Divorce Act (1968), operative and cited by
Justice Guy for Morris, was clear about the civil implications for religious law
in a civil divorce: "[w]here a decree of divorce has been made absolute under
this Act, either party to the former marriage may marry again."'11 The clear
implication of the scenario created by the Divorce Act (1968) is that a persist-
ing religious marriage cannot be a lawful impediment to a civil remarriage. It
does not constitute a prior existing marriage for the purposes of provincial
marriage solemnization acts.
This situation has been reinforced throughout Canadian case law ever since
divorce became an explicit, legislatively entrenched part of the national landscape
in 1968. The Jewish wife in the Morris-case also happened to have been both
divorced and remarried civilly according to "the perfunctory form prescribed for
use by a Judge of the County Court"" -- despite a persisting Jewish marriage.
The Catholic husband, in Justice Guy's example, is not made liable to polygamy
and bigamy charges by remarrying civilly while indissolubly married to another
113. This position underlines the case that has been made out, above, that religious marriages are
civil nullities.
114. Divorce Act (1968), supra note 8, s. 16. This language, which explicitly allowed all Canadian
residents to remarry civilly after a civil divorce, has been removed from the Divorce Act
(1968) and replaced with similar phrasing. However, the phrasing does not clearly articulate
the universal and exclusive operation of state-based divorce law. Compare the Divorce Act
(1985), supra note 101, ss. 13 ("On taking effect, a divorce granted under this Act has
legal effect throughout Canada"), 14 ("On taking effect, a divorce granted under this Act
dissolves the marriage of the spouses"). Despite the difference in phrasing, the common law
that has emerged around both Acts nevertheless cements the clear demarcation between
"official" and "unofficial" law. A religious divorce, or its absence, remains unable to create
or prevent the formation of a subsequent civil marriage.
115. Morris, supra note 109 at para. 50. For an outline of Ontario's "perfunctory form" of
marriage solemnization, see Marriage Act, supra note 81, s. 24(l)-(2) (allowing a judge or a
justice of the peace to perform the marriage "between the hours of 9 o'clock in the morning
and 5 o'clock in the afternoon").
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partner according to Catholic law." 6 Otherwise, the Catholic wife's challenge to
the authority of the court in divorce matters (i.e., an attempt to displace the
general divorce law with the law of a particular religion) would be effective. Jus-
tice Guy is clear that her plea would not have that effect."' The state cannot
create a unified and exclusive jurisdiction for divorce law that thereafter allows
Catholics lawful access to civil remarriage upon their civil divorce, and then
prosecutes them criminally for doing what they-and all other citizens-are
permitted to do through a conjunction of federal divorce legislation and provincial
marriage-solemnization legislation.
The logical implication is that Canada tolerates informal bigamy through
its tolerance of the simultaneous existence of a civil marriage to one party and a
religious marriage to another, particularly in cases where the civil marriage follows
the religious marriage. Furthermore, a clearer implication of the post-Divorce Act
(1968) situation is the jurisprudential exception, carved out for religious mar-
riages, to the Criminal Code prohibition against "any form of polygamy.". 8 Just
as "any form of polygamy ""' is rendered precarious by this state of affairs, the
phrase "any conjugal union, whether or not it is recognized as a binding form
of marriage""12 is rendered ambiguous. Are not Jewish and Catholic marriages
both forms of conjugal union? What, then, can this phrase mean if those two
forms of marriage do not qualify?
It is difficult to justify a sequential distinction between the religious marriage
that is followed by a legitimate civil marriage to another person, and the civil
marriage that is followed by an illegitimate (criminally prohibited) religious
marriage to another person. If the policy justification of the bigamy provision is
to ensure that the status of civil marriage is not muddied by the simultaneous
existence of two forms of marriage, then surely there is no difference between
the two scenarios. They both confound the civil consequences of civil marriage,
leaving unclear the division of property that has been accumulated over the course
of the relationship. They also leave uncertain each partner's separate entitle-
116. Codex Zuris Canonici 1983 Code c. 1141, online: <http://www.intratext.com/IXT/
ENG0017/_P43.HTM> ("A marriage which is ratified and consummated cannot be
dissolved by any human power or by any cause other than death").
117. Morris, supra note 109 at para. 331.
118. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 293(1)(i) (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
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ment to spousal support, and which spouse can claim third-party benefits, if
any (such as standing in wrongful death suits or immigration sponsorship).
Canadian law has already accommodated the particularities of Jewish and
Catholic family law by ensuring that neither group will suffer the indignity of
criminal prosecution due to the interaction of the civil divorce law and the
criminal bigamy law. The state clearly allows plural marriages to exist for
Catholics and Jews (i.e., a persisting religious marriage with a fnew civil marriage
to a separate partner). It is hard to see why other types of plural marriage deriv-
ing from this combination of religious and civil law are not uniformly
acceptable. Once provincial marriage (solemnization) acts become indifferent to
some cases of two "forms of marriage" '121 to different spouses, they have no
principled way of distinguishing between any combination of a single civil
marriage to one person combined with a religious marriage to another. A relig-
ion-neutral formulation would have to be formulated, such that an exception
for all religious marriages would be carved out of "any kind of polygamy" and
"conjugal union. '
This religion-neutral interpretation of both the bigamy and polygamy pro-
visions would put all religious marriage laws on the same footing as Jewish and
Catholic laws. Such an interpretation would also be consistent with the rest of
Canadian law, which regards religious marriages as nullities, and also with the
Civil Marriage Act, which defines marriage only for civilpurposes. For these civil
purposes, bigamy can continue to be read as prohibiting every person, who is
civilly married, from going through another civil marriage with another person.
In light of the variety of ways in which plural religious unions are permitted
in Canadian law, it is hard to single out exactly what residual harm is left in the
polygamy section. We have already seen how family law, since the late 1960s,
has eviscerated bigamy and polygamy of a fair deal of common-sense meaning,
following Lamer's injunction to apply the void for vagueness doctrine to judi-
cial decisions beyond the bare words of a statutory provision. The next section
of this article will demonstrate the struggle of articulating the specific criminal
mischief (as described in criminal law jurisprudence) that these Criminal Code
provisions aim to circumvent.
121. See Criminal Code, supra note 13, ss. 290, 293(1)(i) (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
122. Ibid.
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IV. ADULTERY AND UNMARRIED COHABITATION
In light of both the legal and the sociological developments that have emerged
since the enactment of the polygamy and bigamy provisions, the standard for
what constitutes these particular crimes has become exceedingly difficult to ar-
ticulate. This difficulty arises out of the construal of religious marriages as nullities,
and the interaction between the Divorce Act (1968), religious law, and the
Criminal Code's Offences Against Conjugal Rights. '23
The difficulty in pinpointing the criminal mischief in polygamy also arises
from the paucity of cases that have been prosecuted under the provision since
its inception, the most notable of which involved an Aboriginal man (Bear's
Shin Bone), and the other an "adulterous relationship. " 2 ' The extraordinarily
broad interpretation of conjugal union in Bears Shin Bone needs to be squared
with one of the other cases where the polygamy provisions were prosecuted,
such as the 1937 case of R. v. Tolhurst and Wright. Since this case makes up the
rest of the sparse, recorded case law on the polygamy section, we must turn to its
antiquated parameters in order to decipher the internal logic of the offence over
the first century of its presence in the criminal law. The striking lack of coin-
cidence between the polygamy jurisprudence and contemporary legal
understandings of the family in Canadian law underline how much dust has
settled on this unused section of the Criminal Code.
In the Tolhurst and Wright case, James Tolhurst was civilly married to one
woman and committed adultery with May Wright, who also happened to be
civilly married to another man. Both Tolhurst and Wright were prosecuted for
polygamy. In ruling out a conviction, the judge determined that an adulterous
123. Ibid. (encompassing both bigamy and polygamy).
124. I will focus principally on the Tolhurst and Wright decision from 1937, as both, when read
in conjunction with family law developments since the Divorce Act (1968), amply show
the incoherence of the polygamy provisions. See Bear's Shin Bone, supra note 71; R. v.
Tolhurstand Wright, [1937] 3 D.L.R. 808 (Ont. C.A.) [Tolhurst and Wright]. For other
examples of the scattered (and generally cursory) polygamy and bigamy cases, see Nan-E-
Quis-A-Ka, supra note 74; R. v. Labrie (1891), 7 M.L.R. Q.B. 211 (Que. C.A.); R. v.
Liston (1893), Toronto Assizes (unreported), cited in W. E. Raney, "Bigamy and Divorce"
(1898) 34 Can. L.J. 546 at n. (b); The King v. John Harris (1906) 11 C.C.C. 254 (Que.
C.S.P.); Dionne v. Pepin (1934), 40 R. de Jur. 443 (Que. S.C.); R. v. Clarke (1959), 124
C.C.C. 284 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Moore, [2001] O.J. No. 4513 (Ont. Ct. J.); R. v. Moustafa,
[1991] O.J. No. 835 (Ont. Ct. J. (Prov. Div.)); R. v. Sauvi, [1997] A.J. No. 525 (Alta. Prov.
Ct. (Crim. Div.)); and R. v. Young, [1965] O.J. No. 498 (Ont. C.A.).
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relationship is not a conjugal union. Conjugal unions are only created if they are
"in the guise of marriage"; 25 otherwise they are simply unions.. In other words,
adultery is consistent with monogamy.
This reading of adultery is commensurate with contemporary attitudes in
family law about adultery emerging on the margins. Courts appear poised to
award spousal support to mistresses in long-term intimate relationships with men
who are civilly married to other women, recognizing, for civil purposes, the possi-
bility of multiple simultaneous spouses and the attendant economic vulnerabilities
that arise from these relationships. 26 In Nowell v. Town Estate,2' the Ontario
Court of Appeal awarded the long-term mistress of painter Harold Town a
constructive trust in her consort's property, despite his equally long-term marriage
to his wife.128
Indeed, the contemporary conception of how far an adulterous relationship
can be stretched without becoming "any kind of conjugal union" '29 under the
polygamy section underlines how contorted the distinction between the two
remains, such that the common phenomenon of adultery continues to remain
outside the penumbra of criminal sanction. In Louis v. Lastman,"3 ' for example,
a civil suit for retroactive child. support was brought against former Toronto
Mayor, Mel Lastman, by his two biological children born to his mistress. Last-
man was never charged under the polygamy section. Despite being married
himself, Lastman carried out a fourteen-year relationship with a married
woman who he had intimate relations with on a regular basis, spoke with on a
regular basis, traveled with (staying in motels and resorts around the world),
and shared comfort, care, and intimate confidences with (the woman having
made herself available to him for emotional support and affection). 3' The non-
prosecution of this case under the polygamy section underlines how far an
intimate relationship can go without being considered conjugal under the
Criminal Code. If none of these behaviours rises to "any kind of conjugal
125. Tolhurst and Wright, ibid. at para. 4.
126. See Mahoney v. King (1998), 39 R.F.L (4th) 361 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)); Sturgess v. Shaw
(2002), 31 R.F.L. (5th) 453 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
127. (1997), 30 R.F.L. (4th) 107 (Ont. C.A.).
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. [2001] 18 R.F.L. (5th) 311 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) [Louie].
131. Ibid.
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union"132 under the Criminal Code, the criminal mischief of polygamy becomes
all the more inscrutable.
Drawing on the sparse jurisprudential guideposts of cases like Tolhurst and
Wright in an attempt to arrive at a principled definition of polygamy under the
Criminal Code, it might appear that the mischief in the polygamy provisions
involves a party sustaining not only a civil marriage, but also a simultaneous
long-term marriage-like relationship-a type of relationship not unlike the one
that persisted in Louie. In other words, one might suggest that Tolhurst and
Wright stands for the proposition that a brief sexual fling with one party, while
being civilly married to another, is not going to attract the concern of the
polygamy provisions, while living together as husband and wife (as Bear's Shin
Bone did) with two different women at the same time is, in fact, going to give
rise to such a concern. The real mischief, on this basis, is maintaining a home
and a conjugal life with one spouse, while being civilly married to another.
This suggestion for a principled civil definition of polygamy is not supported
by the facts of Tolhurst and Wright. Not only did Tolhurst live with Wright "as
man and wife,"1 33 they also had four children together. They might have been
committing mere adultery vis-ih-vis their civil marriages, but their relationship
could not fit more squarely within the current definitions of common law spouse.
In Ontario, for example, that definition is construed as cohabiting together in a
conjugal relationship for a period of not less than three years or in a relationship
of some permanence if both are the parents of a child." ' Wright bore a minimum
of four children and raised them with Tolhurst, which meant that not only were
Tolhurst and Wright in a relationship of some permanence with a child, they
also surpassed the criterion set by most provincial family law legislation for
childless couples (i.e., when the four nine-month pregnancies are added up,
leaving aside any associated years of child rearing), which alone accounted for
thirty-six months (i.e., three years).
According to the facts of Tolhurst and Wright-and the logic that ensues from
those facts-statutory unmarried cohabitation is not "in the guise of marriage," 3 '
132. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
133. Tolhurst and Wright, supra note 124 at para. 1.
134. Family Law Act, supra note 77, s. 29.
135. Tolhurst and Wright, supra note 124 at para. 4.
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nor in a form of "conjugal union,"'36 nor "any form of polygamy"'37 for the
purposes of the polygamy provisions. Instead, long-term unmarried cohabita-
tion to one spouse, with or without children, appears to be consistent with
monogamy to another. Living in unmarried cohabitation while being civilly
married to another does not constitute polygamy. A fortiori, if simultaneous
unmarried cohabitation and civil marriage to different people do not court the
polygamy provisions, two simultaneous cohabitational relationships will not
either. The inexorable logic of the extant criminal cases on the polygamy offence
therefore seems to be that Canadian law appears to tolerate plural unmarried
cohabitation.
The criminal law judgment in Tolhurst and Wright is clearly out of step with
contemporary legal understandings of cohabitational relationships. Where the
judge in Tolhurst saw no marriage-like relationship in an enduring adulterous
one, even the Criminal Code now defines "common-law partners" as those who
cohabit in a conjugal relationship for a period of at least one year.'38 The empha-
sis on formal conjugality in the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1937 has now been
turned on its head, such that theformal conjugality of civil or religious marriage
is irrelevant in law, and the functional conjugality of the union is the locus to
which courts must turn to in order to determine the mischief of polygamy. Again,
the concept of conjugality bears the full weight of the offence of polygamy-a
weight that is too precariously perched and cannot support itself.
Before finally considering this heavily burdened concept of conjugal union,
there is a cognate area of law worth canvassing that also speaks to Justice Lamer's
requirement that vagueness be examined by looking beyond the bare words of
the statutory provision to the provision as it is interpreted-and applied in judi-
cial decisions.139 This corner of jurisprudence involves the question of
criminal indecency in the context of polyamory.
V. SEXUAL MISCHIEF
If, on the dated authority of Tolhurst and Wright, it is not living together with
one person while being civilly married to another that is problematic, it might
136. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
137. Ibid.
138. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 2.
139. Prostitution Reference, supra note 11 at para. 40.
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appear that the mischief in the polygamy provision is concerned with the
prospect of a party having ongoing simultaneous sexual congress with one party,
while being civilly married to another. However, recent polyamory case law
affirms that sex with one partner, while being civilly married to and in a sexually-
active relationship with another, does not constitute polygamy.
In the 1982 case of R. v. Mason,"' an Ontario court held that 'swinging'
(spouse-swapping) parties, in a private non-commercial setting, does not
constitute an indecent act for the purposes of the Criminal Code. Husbands
and wives (common law and civilly married) can freely invite other sexual part-
ners into their homes for the pleasure of either or both. The acceptability of
home-based swinging to prevailing community standards v'as complemented
at the Supreme Court by the acceptability of swinging in bars. In the 2005 case
of R. v. Labaye,' 1 the accused operated a club in Montreal, the purpose of which
was to permit couples (married or not) and single people to meet each other for
group sex. Labaye was charged with keeping a common bawdy-house under
section 210(1) of the Criminal Code. The question of whether swinging is
consistent with polygamy has not been tested directly by the polyamory cases.
However, the fact that the SCC has found that swinging in private homes and
clubs does not amount to a criminal act speaks to whatever mischief can be
discerned in the polygamy provisions.
The offence of keeping a common bawdy-house is defined by reference to the
slippery concept of "indecency. 1 2 The central issue in Labaye was whether run-
ning a club for group sex and the swapping of partners constituted the facilitation
of acts of indecency. Setting a threshold for indecency became the fulcrum of the
case, and the concept of harm is at the centre of the mischief of indecency. In
acquitting the accused, the SCC made clear that the Crown had failed to establish
that any harm had been committed, the threshold for which was set by determin-
ing whether the conduct confronts the public with behaviour that interferes
with their autonomy and liberty, pre-disposes others to anti-social behaviour, or
140. (1982), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 461 (Ont. Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div.)).
141. [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 [Labaye].
142. See Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 210(1) (dealing with the offence of keeping a common
"bawdy-house," which, in turn, is defined in s. 197(1) as a place kept or occupied, or
resorted to "by one or more persons for the purpose of prostitution or the practice of acts of
indecency").
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physically or psychologically harms the people involved in the conduct. 1"3 The
harm also needs to be incompatible with the proper functioning of society.
In the case of swinging, in so far as the activity was taking place in a private
setting, the threshold of harm was not met. The privacy, behind which group
sex was veiled, eliminated potential harm to the liberty rights of other citizens
through confrontation. It also eliminated fears about the fostering of anti-social
behaviour in others, which "can arise only if members of the public may be ex-
posed to the conduct or material in question.""' On the question of whether
swinging is incompatible with the proper functioning of society, the court also
invoked the privacy of the behaviour to inoculate the activity from posing a risk
of harm to society's proper functioning. The court further clarifies that
"[v]ague generalizations that the sexual conduct at issue will lead to attitudinal
changes and hence anti-social behaviour will not suffice.""' Mr. Labaye was
not guilty of indecency because he made sure that only willing people would
see the sexual conduct.
The facts of Labaye speak to the types of plural and simultaneous sexual
partnering that are generally not the norm within polygamous unions. Afortiori,
the judgment indicates that whatever sexual activity occurs between consenting
adults within polygamous unions also fails to meet the threshold of harm requi-
site for indecency, most particularly because polygamous unions, like marriages
in general, conduct their erotic lives in private. Further, recapitulating the Court's
assessment of harm in the context of polygamy, "vague generalizations"'" that
polygamy "will lead to attitudinal changes and hence anti-social behaviour will
not suffice'"" to establish the harm of polygamy.
The Labaye case appears to speak definitively to any conjecture that the
criminal mischief in polygamy is related to indecent sexual acts. Multiple simiul-
taneous sexual partners (married or otherwise) are not indecent in criminal law;
multiple sequential partners (married or not) within plural unions then fall
substantially short of the threshold of harm. The polyamory cases therefore go
some distance to further eviscerating the content of the polygamy provisions.
143. Labaye, supra note 141 at para. 62.
144. Ibid. at para. 47.
145. Ibid. at para. 58.
146. Ibid. at para. 58.
147. Ibid.
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The result in Labaye stands for the proposition that sexual activity, in general,
within polygamous unions is not the targeted harm. Consensual sexual activity
between adults is covered by privacy.
In light of the foregoing analysis, it appears that the remaining hallmark of
the criminal mischief in polygamy must be the situation where a person has
more than one spouse at the same time. Clearly, swinging is not the problem.
Rather, it appears to be the point at which the relationship with each sexual
partner becomes spouse-like that the mischief in polygamy is activated. This
identification of the mischief gets us close to the second part of section 293-
"conjugal unions"-which is the only part of the section that appears to remain
standing once all of the other exceptions to polygamy have been carved out by
the substratum of values that has churned up the legal landscape over the last
half-century. Perhaps it seems viable that multiple conjugal unions might have a
purchase in this exercise; in other words, it seems that the original drafters of the
polygamy provisions nailed it when they referenced polygamy to conjugality.
It remains to be seen whether this last understanding of the mischief in
polygamy holds any merit. Once the meaning of conjugal union is determined,
it follows that more than one of those types of union at the same time, with
separate people, will presumably represent the behaviour that criminal law forbids.
This search for a definition of conjugal union takes us away from the criminal
law, which does not itself define what constitutes this form of relationship. To
get a clear sense of what is meant by conjugality, we need to return to family
law, which has spent the last forty years trying to clarify the term since the
Divorce Act (1968) opened up a revolution in the ways that the "family" is
legally structured and sociologically conceived. It is in family law that both stat-
utes and cases have struggled to clarify open-ended statutory language through
judicial interpretation.
Vl. CONJUGAL UNIONS
Let us leave aside for a moment the unquestioned assumption that we have
good reason to care so much that a swinging partner stays in the bed a bit too
long and whips up a batch of French toast a few times too many. Let us also
ignore the unquestioned assumption that we have good reason to care even if
none of the parties themselves seem to mind. In other words, let us discount
the search for a principled policy justification for whatever residual understand-
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ing of conjugality is left in the Offences Against Conjugal Rights" 8 once swinging,
adultery, religious marriage, and (on the polygamy section's jurisprudence) even
unmarried cohabitation are removed from consideration. The definition of
conjugal union has enough difficulty on its own.
To determine-whether or not someone is simultaneously in two or more
spouse-like relationships, we would first need to determine what it is to be
spouse-like (i.e., determine exactly what makes a spouse a spouse). We need a
clear sense of the concept of spouse (that which is at the essence of the married
relationship) in order to determine whether or not someone has multiple,
simultaneous spouses and whether or not they are in a common law, religious,
or civil marriage.
Identifying what the essence of the marriage relationship is for the purposes
of determining what is marriage-like, in the absence of the actual solemnization
ceremony, has proven to be an increasingly elusive quest. The institution of
marriage now contains such an extensive array of variants (i.e., with or without
children, living in the same or separate residences, with or without sexual activ-
ity, with traditional, equal, or reverse-traditional gender roles, and so on) that it
is difficult to identify anything more than patterns across a range of marriages,
rather than a set of essential criteria. Furthermore, the frequency of committed
relationships flourishing beyond the boundaries of civil marriage is increasing,
with the result that the law has been restructured to attach similar legal conse-
quences to both married and unmarried relationships.' 9
The growing frequency at which couples are declining to enter into civil
marriages while persisting in committed relationships has led to a significant
overhaul of both federal and provincial legislation. This reform, which is meant
to accommodate the aforementioned sociological shift of the last half-century,
became most pressing when it coincided with a sequence of successful gay-
rights cases that saw governments ungraciously scrambling to recognize same-
148. Criminal Code, supra note 13, ss. 290, 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
149. The 2007 Statistics Canada report on changing family demographics indicates that, between
2001 and 2006, the number of cohabiting families in Canada grew by 18.9 per cent, five
times faster than married couples, to form 15.5 per cent of census families in the country.
See Statistics Canada, Demography Division, Family Portrait: Continuity and Change in
Canadian Families and Households in 2006, 2006 Census by Anne Milan, Mireille V&ina &
Carrie Wells (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2007) at 6, 9, online: <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.
ca/collection_2007/statcan/97-553-X/97-553-XIE 2 0 0 6 0 0 1 .pdf>.
352 120091 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
sex spouses without changing the definition of marriage. This statutory over-
haul of the concept of spouse was stimulated by a seiies of SCC cases that found
that discrimination on the basis of either marital status or sexual orientation
creates unconstitutional violations of the right to equal treatment under the
law. Two cases in particular, Miron v. Trudel5 ° and M v. H.,5 led to a massive
overhaul of the legislative landscape. Sixty-seven federal statutes and numerous
provincial statutes were amended to ensure that unmarried cohabitants,
whether in same-sex or opposite-sex relationships, would have the same rights
as married spouses in both fields of legislative activity. Legislation dealing with
matters from tax deductions to pensions, death benefits to intestate inheritance,
and standing in wrongful death -suits to immigration sponsorship now draws
upon the concept of a conjugal union in order to demarcate between those who
qualify and those who do not.
The statutory definition of a cohabiting spouse typically stipulates a specific
period of cohabitation, generally ranging from one to three years, after which
legal consequences ensue (depending on the statute). For entry into unmarried
cohabitation, the statutory period substitutes for the single event of a solemni-
zation ceremony. Out of this definition flow legal consequences that are closely
assimilated, if not identical, to those that arise from marriage. However, it is
not simply living together that attracts this marriage-like status. There is an
ineffable something more that transforms housemates of one to three years
into spouses.
Embedded in the definition of cohabitation in different federal and provincial
statutory regimes is a reference to conjugality. For example, Ontario ' Family
Law Act"5 2 defines cohabitation as "liv[ing] together in a conjugal relationship,
whether within or outside marriage."' 53 Those who live together, but are not in
a conjugal relationship, would be disqualified or exempted from any provisions
that relate to spousal cohabitation. Someone who lives non-conjugally with an-
other (even beyond the three year mark) will not owe spousal support, will not
be a pension beneficiary, will not be able to sue for the other's wrongful death,
will- not inherit property when the other dies intestate, and so on. Therefore,
150. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
151. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 [M. v. H.].
152. Family Law Act, supra note 77.
153. Ibid., s. 1(1) [emphasis added].
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this concept of conjugality has become the proxy for determining what is spouse-
like or marriage-like behaviour.
Presumably, the notion of conjugality would help to determine what it
is to live "under the guise of marriage"' "' for the purposes of the polygamy
provisions, given that the other elements appear to have been read out of
them. The concept of conjugality, however, has merely displaced the diffi-
culty of understanding what is spouse-like or "under the guise of marriage"'
'1 5
with a term that is laced with ambiguity. The legal content of the concept
has been filled in by judicial interpretation, and that interpretation has
changed over time.
There are two principal ways in which conjugality has been defined in
common law: one is subjective and the other functional. The former is now
dated and the latter is fairly confused. Both ways of construing what constitutes
spouse-like or marriage-like cohabitation are canvassed in a compelling article by
Brenda Cossman and Bruce Ryder.'56 They depict the test for the subjective
equivalence of a relationship to marriage as one hinged upon whether an unmar-
ried cohabiting couple has voluntarily embraced such a status. The touchstone
of whether the relationship is conjugal is the nature of their subjective intentions.
In the case of spousal support, for example, the test would rely upon whether
the couple pledged to mutually support each other.'
This approach is now dated by virtue of the fact that courts have found it
difficult to discern a common intention, either because the parties might have
had different intentions, or because they lacked a clear intention at all over the
course of the relationship's evolution. More significant, however, was the emer-
gence of the pressing policy objective to protect cohabitants (particularly women)
from the economic disadvantages that arise during an interdependent relation-
ship. These are the same concerns that allow courts to read constructive trusts
into property owned by one spouse who has been unjustly enriched by the other
spouse's unremunerated domestic contribution. The former spouse's subjective
intention cannot be permitted to circumvent the economic interdependence
and concomitant legal responsibilities that emerge from the way that the parties
154. Tolhurst and Wright, supra note 124 at para. 4.
155. Ibid.
156. Cossman & Ryder, "Marriage-Like," supra note 23.
157. Ibid.
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structure their relationship. Because of such considerations, the subjective test
has fallen out of judicial favour.
The functional equivalence test has emerged in tandem with the demise of
the subjective approach. This approach to the determination of whether a rela-
tionship 'is marriage-like relies upon an identification of the basic dimensions
and functions of a marital relationship to which the relationship in question is
compared. The 1980 Molodowich v. Penttinens8 case consolidates the functional
attributes laid out in prior case law. In M. v. H., Justice Cory recapitulates and
endorses the Molodowich approach when he notes that "the generally accepted
characteristics of a conjugal relationship ... include shared shelter, sexual and
personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and children, as
well as the societal perception of the couple."" 9 However, not all of these elements
will necessarily be present in all married relationships. The functional equivalence
of conjugality with this loose agglomeration of marital attributes is problematic.
Cossman and Ryder underline these drawbacks and argue that the concept of
functional equivalence to marriage has grown increasingly tenuous in the light
of jurisprudential developments.
The first attenuation of the test derives from the dissociation of sexual rela-
tions and conjugality-popularly thought to be the latter's sine qua non. As
Cossman and Ryder note, Canadian judges have begun to find conjugality in
the absence of sexual relations. Alongside Justice Cory's views on this matter in
M. v. H., they cite the 1990 Richardson v. Richardson16 case, in which the judge
held that
The parties may, for a number of reasons, such as age, illness or indifference,
choose not to have sexual relations but still live together and hold themselves out
to be husband and wife in other respects. For that reason, it is my view that the
trial judge was wrong to have made sexual relations between the parties a requisite
for a conjugal relationship. 161
While this dissociation of conjugality from sexual relations leaves the functional
equivalence test baffling for family law, it also makes it that much more diffi-
cult to discern the mischief in the polygamy provisions.
158. (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
159. M. v. H., supra note 151 at para. 59.
160. Richardson v. Richardson (1990), 107 N.B.R. (2d) 49 (C.A.).
161. Ibid
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Another drawback of the functional test-not just for a finding of polygamy,
but for all legislative regimes that rely upon the concept of conjugality-is the
privacy-violating nature of the inquiries that courts must pursue in order to
establish it. This is most evident with respect to the dimensions of sexual and
personal behaviour to which Justice Co ry alludes. Although sexual relations
may not be necessary to a finding of conjugality using the Molodowich criteria,
the functionalist approach has led courts to engage in a strikingly intrusive (if
not unseemly) set of questions. The judge in the 1978 case of Stoikiewicz v.
Filas1 2 illustrates the type of questioning that proves the point about unseemliness:
Q: Mrs. Stoikiewicz, did you live with Mr. Filas as husband and wife?
A: That's the way it was.
Q: Did you share the same bedroom?
A: No.
Q: I see. Did you have sexual relations with each other?
A: Yes.
Q: Was it frequent or just occasional?
A: Occasional. From time to time.
Q: Did you cook his meals?
A: I cooked for him.
163
The actual finding in Stokiewicz was that a conjugal relationship did not
exist, despite the answers to these questions. More to the point is the nature
of the inquiry upon which the court had to embark in order to establish this
finding. Taking into account that the polygamy provisions permit swinging
and adultery, it is easy to imagine that the hair-splitting distinctions between
this monogamy-commensurate behaviour, and sexual and personal relations
that are not monogamy-commensurate, could only become more unseemly
and offensive.
It is worth reiterating at this point that, aside from the concern about the
unseemliness and intrusiveness of inquiries into the kind of sexual activity that
goes on behind the doors of polygamous unions, this line of questioning is ver-
boten for establishing the crime of polygamy. As argued above, it follows from
Labaye that sexual activity with multiple consenting partners (including spouses),
provided that it is conducted in private, does not constitute a criminal harm in
162. Stoikiewicz v. Filas (1978), 7 R.F.L. (2d) 366 (Ont. Fam. Ct.).
163. Ibid. at para. 3.
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polygamy. If swinging and private orgies with (or without) one's spouse are not
indecent, then surely there is nothing in the sexual activity of polygamy that
rises to an act of indecency.
While the job of a family law judge may be made harder by the reference to
sexual activity as a recurrent commonality in conjugal unions, the job of a criminal
law judge looking for proof of conjugality for the purposes of "any conjugal un-
ion"16 is made lighter by Labaye's elimination of consensual adult sexual activity
from the set of mischi efs that might constitute the criminal act of polygamy. The
elimination of sexual activity from the repertoire of harms embedded within "any
kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time""16 further
renders conjugality into a vapidity for criminal law.
There is one further drawback pointed out by Cossman and Ryder that
perhaps demolishes the use of conjugality far more swiftly for the polygamy
provisions. As they note, none of the criteria in the functional-equivalence test
are essential. The test does not provide a kind of bright line distinction between
conjugal and non-conjugal relationships. Citing Justice Cory, they note how
the test has become extraordinarily open-ended:
In order to come within the definition, neither opposite-sex couples nor same-sex
couples are required to fit precisely the traditional marital model to demonstrate that
the relationship is conjugal. ... Courts have wisely determined that the approach to
determining whether a relationship is conjugal must be flexible. This must be so, for
the relationships of all couples will vary widely. 
166
While the flexibility inherent in this test allows courts to find conjugal-
ity where an exact equivalence with an ideal model of marriage cannot be
found, the result is an astonishing lack of clarity that impedes the ability of
couples to anticipate when they do or do not qualify. As Cossman and Ryder
point out: "in sacrificing clarity and predictability for flexibility and diver-
sity, the judicial understanding of conjugality now comes close to an 'I know
it when I see it' approach."' 67 While the conceptual looseness in the concept
of conjugality may be problematic for family law, it is poised to be fatal for
criminal law.
164. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
165. Ibid
166. M. v. H., supra note 151 at paras. 60-61.
167. Cossman & Ryder, "Marriage-Like," supra note 23 at 299.
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If the state cares enough to make a distinction between swinging, adultery,
and polygamy-so much so that it is prepared to attach the potential jeopardy
of five years imprisonment to the behaviour-then a reasonable person should
be able to foresee when their behaviour enters the prohibited zone. They should
not have to wait upon the intuitions of an oracular judge.
VII. VOID FOR VAGUENESS
Taking into account all of the above-mentioned statutory and jurisprudential
understandings of what constitutes a "form of marriage," '168 "any form of polyg-
amy," 69 and "any kind of conjugal union, whether or not it is by law recognized
as a binding form of marriage," ' it becomes virtually impossible to articulate
what the criminal conception of polygamy amounts to and what the core mis-
chief is that underlies it. In short, it becomes virtually impossible for the
provisions to constitute fair notice that particular conduct falls within the scope
of the offence.
On its own literal terms, the polygamy section has an exceptional reach in
the concept of "any kind of conjugal union.". 1 However, all manner of excep-
tions have been jurisprudentially carved out of this spectacularly broad spectrum
of relationships. What remains after the "bare words of the statutory provision" ' 2
are understood in Tolhurst and Wright, Bear's Shin Bone, Morris, and Lastman is
an incoherent miscellany of ideas that is held together by a common law thread
of "conjugality," which is itself frayed and torn. This jurisprudence does not tie
.the concept into place when conjoined with the fact that unmarried cohabitation,
adulterous affairs (both short and long-term, with and without children), and
religious marriages are not conjugal unions for the polygamy provision, and do
not serve as lawful impediments to civil marriage either.
While it is clear that no law can meet the standard of absolute certainty, the
principles of both fair notice to citizens (particularly for criminal law, where
individual liberty is in jeopardy) and limitation of enforcement discretion indicate
strongly that the current polygamy section offends the principles of fundamental
168. Criminal Code, supra note 13, ss. 290, 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
169. Ibid., s. 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid.
172. Prostitution Reference, supra note 11 at para. 40.
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justice that are set out in section 7 of the Charter. This is particularly true in
light of a massive shift in the substratum of values regarding family and sexuality
since the late 1960s-a substratum that is accessible to all Canadians who
might otherwise lack access to the technicalities of formal notice, and which
also provides the moral foreseeability of harm, while generating the substantive
notice that inoculates legal enactments against claims of arbitrariness.173
That the vagueness of the polygamy section is susceptible of generating a
"standardless sweep""'7-and that it opens the door for "law enforcement officials
to pursue their personal predilections"' ---can already be seen in the lamentable
history of its highly discriminate use against minority religious groups and mar-
ginalized Aboriginal people. The hypocrisy of pursuing openly polygamous
relationships, while leaving typically occult, long-term adulterous relationships
intact-relationships which appear functionally to serve very similar purposes
to polygamy for men-further underlines the unprincipled motivations driving
the law. Bearing in mind case law, subsequent statutory law in a range of fields,
and social developments over the last century, it becomes extraordinarily difficult
to state what the criminal conception of polygamy amounts to, apart from a
mechanism to discipline and convict socially and politically marginalized groups.
As a result of all of these developments, there is no way to salvage the polygamy
provisions and to give "sensible meaning ' to their terms.
If the provisions are nullified by the courts, it will be up to Parliament to
devise a modified definition of polygamy that captures whatever acceptable mis-
chief remains once the original objective has been excised.177 Yet Parliament will
not have a clean slate from which to create a new polygamy law. It will have to
legislate on top of the landscape of the entire statutory and jurisprudential history
elaborated above-a history that would force Parliament into navigating the
inconceivably narrow straits left behind by all of the exceptions.
173. NSPharmaceutical, supra note 36.
174. Prostitution Reference, supra note 11 at para. 41.
175. Ibid at para. 40. Again, both of these dangers were critiqued in Justice Lamer's disquisition on
void for vagueness.
176. Ibid.
177. Obviously, I am assuming that Parliament will not invoke the notwithstanding clause, which
it did not seriously contemplate doing for same-sex marriage, and cannot contemplate doing
without violating a longstanding customary prohibition on invoking a clause that allows
Parliament to pass legislation that unequivocally violates fundamental human rights.
DRUMMOND, POLYGAMY'S INSCRUTABLE MISCHIEF 359
It seems clear, therefore, that the polygamy provisions of the Criminal Code
are unconstitutional under section 7 of the Charter. What remains to be done is
an analysis of whether the provision can be saved under section 1 of the Charter-
an argument that is ultimately unsustainable. The section 1 analysis is important,
given that one of the most common arguments made for retaining the polygamy
section, despite a foreseeable violation of other fundamental rights in the Consti-
tution Act, 1982, is that the underlying purpose of the section protects interests
that are paramount in Canadian society-specifically, the vulnerabilities of.
women and children-and that entrench our international commitments under
the United Nations Convention to Eliminate all forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW)'78 These latter concerns are often articulated as the residual
concerns upon which the polygamy section pivots. Whether these latter-day
attempts to identify polygamy's criminal mischief might be sustainable under a
section 1 analysis becomes a part of this article's search for coherence in the
Criminal Code's polygamy doctrine.
VIII. RESIDUAL PURPOSES
An argument under section 1 of the Charter, that there is a pressing and sub-
stantial objective that should override our concerns about the violation of
citizens' constitutionally-entrenched rights to liberty, may be jeopardized by
the existence of the objective that originally animated the prohibition-that
is, to isolate and prosecute religious minorities. The unsavory history of the
selective use of the provision against Aboriginal people supports the idea that the
polygamy provision was crafted as a means of disciplining and colonizing socially
and politically marginal groups. If there is an alternate pressing and substantial
objective, it has to overcome the historical suffusion of the polygamy provisions
with the unacceptable original objective of targeting religious minorities.
In their report to the Status of Women Canada, Bailey et al. argue that
"[t]he prohibition's ecclesiastical origin as well as its express reference to Mormons
suggests that its pressing and substantial objective is to serve a religious purpose.""'
Even if the more contemporary justification for a prohibition on polygamy stems
178. Convention on the Elimination "ofAll Forms of Discrimination against. Women, 18 December
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981), online:
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm> [CEDAW].
179. Bailey etal, supra note 30 at 23.
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from concerns about the vulnerabilities of women and children, "the Supreme
Court of Canada will not entertain shifting purposes, meaning that the gov-
ernment can rely only on the purpose that animated the provision when it was
enacted."180 They argue that, in the face of a finding that the prohibition on
polygamy infringes the section 2(a) right to freedom of religion, the Crown will
have difficulty establishing that the impugned provision is of sufficient importance
under section 1 to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right. The
original religious objectives of the legislation-even if now suffused with a con-
cern for the equality rights of women-are unlikely to be considered pressing and
substantial enough, as the law of this country has come out from under the
shadow of Christian marriage.
This argument about the shifting purposes of the polygamy provisions
may not ultimately hold when implying, as it does, that Parliament is pre-
cluded from embodying new social objectives in modified, although used,
legislative flasks. To be compelling, this argument would need to establish
that religious objectives continue to animate the legislation. The fact that the
Criminal Code was amended in the 1950s to remove explicit references to a
now prohibited religious objective would suggest that the original anti-
Mormon animus of the section has been expunged.
However, those who argue that the original religious purpose has been over-
taken by the pressing and substantial purpose of protecting vulnerable women
and children within plural unions18' may face just as difficult a challenge in estab-
lishing that the government was preoccupied with this guiding concern in
1954.182 The amendment, which dropped the reference to Mormons in 1954,
was part of a general overhaul of the Criminal Code in the early 1950s in order to
modernize its content and remove antiquated formulations and offences. As per
the reasoning in Big M, deciphering the purpose of legislation hinges upon "the
180. Ibid. at 23. For their "shifting purposes" argument, Bailey et al rely upon both R. v. BigM
Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [BigM] and R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2S.C.R. 731.
181. See Bala, supra note 32; Cook & Kelly, supra note 42.
182. Under the first branch of the Oakes test (to determine which claims about limiting rights are
justifiable under section 1 of the Charter). "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Charter, supra note
5, s. 1. See also Bala, ibid.
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intent of those who drafted and enacted the legislation at the time." 8 3 The
Crown is precluded from ascribing a new purpose to legislation in the course of
Charter litigation. Arguments that reference a child and woman-centred preoccu-
pation underlying section 293 will need to square this conception of polygamy's
paramount harm with legislative history.
The legislative history of the polygamy section may, in any event, be of
diminished importance with respect to its constitutionality. Even if the guid-
ing concern of protecting women and children were acknowledged to be its
pressing and substantial aim, the contemporary objective of protecting them
may in fact be far more easily and fairly met through other laws and social
policies that are more rationally connected with this goal than through the
criminalization of polygamy. The extraordinary vagueness and overbreadth
of the polygamy provision generates an extremely high threshold that must
be met in order to justify the violation of section 7 liberty rights. Further,
this threshold is reinforced by the abundance of ways that are available to
meet the objective, such that no harm is done to religious freedom, liberty,
equality interests, or fundamental justice. Even if the protection of women
and children was acknowledged to be the section's overarching purpose, the
question that remains is whether or not the criminal prohibition of polyg-
amy is a proportionate response to these concerns.
I will concede, because I readily perceive it to be true, that this is not a frivo-
lous objective with little or no social import. The protection of vulnerable women
and children from the asymmetries inherent in plural marriages (which are virtu-
ally always polygynous rather than polyandrous) is an objective that has accrued a
great deal of scientific support in the last several decades. There is an abundance
of reports from around the world that support the voices of women who have fled
from, or feel trapped within, polygamous unions. 84 Further, this objective is em-
bodied in the CEDAW. In its General Recommendation on Equality in Marriage
and Family Relations, 85 CEDAW urges that "[p]olygamous marriage contravenes
a woman's right to equality with men, and can have such serious emotional and
183. BigM, supra note 180 at para. 91.
184. For a particularly committed presentation of this case, see Cook & Kelly, supra note 42. For
a review of this literature, see also Bailey et al., supra note 30.
185. CEDAW, supra note 178 at General Recommendation No. 21 (13th session, 1994), online:
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm>.
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financial consequences for her and her dependants that such marriages ought to
be discouraged and prohibited.' 18
6
Canada, as a party to the CEDAW, has committed itself to "take all appro-
priate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating
to marriage and family relations." 8 ' How, then, can Canada uphold this inter-
national commitment and uphold its legitimate aspiration to liberate women
and their dependents from the serious emotional and financial consequences
that can arise froi polygamy? Is criminalizing plural marriage the only means
of meeting that international commitment? Is it the most effective?
As has already been argued, the overbreadth of section 293, in catching
"[e]very one"'88 who engages in a plural union, is radically at odds with the
feminist objective; women in plural unions are subject to being torn away from
their children for up to five years in a federal penitentiary, while their children
are deprived of a mother for a yawning black hole of time-just as they stand to
be deprived of their fathers. The stigma of criminal prosecution and conviction
(and in the case of Bountiful, public scrutiny and shaming in the national media)
can only add to the burdens of the very parties that the law purports to protect.
Further, the deprivation of either one or both of the parents leaves children
poised to experience extreme levels of emotional and financial turbulence. The
criminalization of both parties to the union also adds a thick layer of wariness
and caution to any aspirations that such women might entertain in anticipation
of the state's safety net capturing their fall, should they exit the relationship.
These contradictions between the polygamy provision and its purported
objective strongly suggest that the criminalization of plural unions is not the least
drastic means for meeting that objective.' 89 Are there other, less punitive means
of meeting the objective of lightening the miseries and inequalities to which
women in plural forms of marriage may be prone? If they exist, then the minimal
impairment test of section 1 of the Charter will not be met by the current polygamy
provision. Let me suggest that such measures are in abundance, many of which
are already in place and merely awaiting the removal of criminal stigmatization
186. Ibid., art. 16(14).
187. Ibid., art. 16.
188. Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 293 (as amended by R.S., c. C-34, s. 257).
189. For the requirements of the minimal impairment test, see Charter, supra note 5, s. 1.
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in order for women in oppressive plural unions to exit the relationships with
the same confidence as women in oppressive monogamous unions.
A substantial movement towards the objective has already been made by
ensuring that civil consequences, such as spousal support, flow from the factual
reality of all relationships that endure for the statutory period of cohabitation
for common-law spouses (generally one to three years, depending on which federal
or provincial statute is in play, and/or for relations of some permanence with a
child). Whether or not a union is polygamous, these entitlements flow from the
duration of the relationship. This defacto entitlement to spousal support also
computes with the new Federal Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines,"'i which roots
the entitlement to spousal support in the duration of the relationship and the
parenting obligations that parties incur.191
Another substantial movement flows from the fact that child custody and
child support are not dependent upon the legitimacy of the form of marriage.
Family law legislation across Canada's provinces brought about an end to the
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children in the 1970s. Child
support obligations are linked to the biological relationship between the parents
and their children, as well as to the social relation between children and those par-
ents who stand in loco parentis (in the place of a parent).'92 The fact that parties to
a polygamous union are entitled to use the constructive-trust doctrines to establish
a beneficial interest in accumulated marital property, if they can establish a con-
tribution to- it, makes it easier for all women to exit degrading and abusive
relationships, whether or not those unions are polygamous or monogamous.
In the definition of those spouses who have access to the default property
regime of married spouses, legislation such as the Ontario Family Law Act already
includes marriages that are actually or potentially polygamous when celebrated
in a jurisdiction whose system of law recognizes them as valid.'93 If courts (which
have yet to weigh in on what this provision means) were to interpret the section
to mean that all polygamous marriages, whether or not they are formed in
Canada, give rise to rights in the default statutory marital-property regime, this
190. See Department of Justice Canada, SpousalSupportAdvisory Guidelines by Carol Rogerson &
Rollie Thompson, (Toronto: Family, Children and Youth Section, Department of Justice
Canada, 2008), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/pad-rpad/res/spag/index.html>.
191. Ibid.
192. DivorceAct (1968), supra note 8, s. 2(2)(a).
193. Family Law Act, supra note 77, s. 1(2).
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would bolster the ability of women in polygamous -unions to leave without con-
fronting the debilitating fear of poverty.
It would also help to eliminate the inequities and grave emotional and fi-
nancial consequences that are suffered by the women in polygamous marriage
relationships, if provincial social-assistance rates were raised to such an extent that
abused women across Canada would no longer feel that remaining in an abusive
relationship would be preferable to the indignities and acute deprivations of
welfare. 9' In addition, all oppressed wives, whether in common law relationships,
monogamous marriages, or polygamous unions, would be rescued by the rising
tide of a sorely needed national daycare system that would permit single mothers
to work (or train for work), while leaving their young children in affordable and
adequate child-care arrangements.
All of these measures (and many more) would go, and have gone, a substantial
way to meeting Canada's commitment under the CEDAW to "take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations,"'95 regardless of whether those women have come
from plural or monogamous unions. However, there is another measure that
Canada could take that would entrench-in a more global, albeit symbolic,
way-its specific international commitment with respect to polygamy. Parliament
could do so in a manner that might well skirt the constitutional problems that
plague the polygamy provisions: they could leave the Civil Marriage Act in place,
untouched, and modify' the bigamy provisions, to unequivocally state that the
only form of criminally prohibited plural union is that of two simultaneous
civil marriages to different partners.
The Civil Marriage Act already only refers to marriages "for civil purposes,
196
and confines them to monogamous unions. The bigamy provision already appears,
on a reasonable interpretation, to uniquely prohibit everyone who is civilly mar-
ried from entering into another civil marriage with another person. The section
needs only to be cleaned up in order to explicitly meet this objective-that is,
the objective of maintaining clarity around the status of civil marriage. This latter
194. See Janet Mosher etal., "Walking on Eggshells: Abused Women's Experiences of Ontario's
Welfare System - Final Report of Research Findings from the Woman and Abuse Welfare
Research Project" (5 April 2004), online: <http://www.yorku.ca/yorkweb/special/Welfare_
Reportwalkingon-eggshells-final-report.pdf>.
195. CEDAW, supra note 178.
196. Civil Marriage Act, supra note 34, s. 2.
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objective may continue to have value if Canadians continue to prefer (as they
appear to do by an increasingly narrow margin) 197 civil marriage to unmarried
cohabitation. All bigamous civil unions would be captured by this newly clarified
bigamy provision-leaving things such as religious marriages, adultery, and
mistresses alone, as none of the state's business. Spouses in each of the latter
arrangements would remain capable of acquiring benefits under the status of
unmarried cohabitation or statutory and equitable regimes.
For good measure, Parliament could also finally occupy the jurisdictional
field it was given in 1867 and stipulate a minimum age requirement for consent
to marriage, while entrenching the common law requirement for bilateral consent
as a necessary condition between marriage partners. These legislative modifications
would reflect the prevailing Canadian sensibility about the precious, yet vulner-
able, integrity of young people and the vital importance of women's agency within
married life. They would find further legitimacy in the broader social policies that
have consolidated among the community of nations. Canada's commitment to
this larger community is embodied in its formal assent to the CEDAW provi-
sions that require the government to ensure that women and men have: "(a) the
same right to enter marriage, (b) the same right to freely choose a spouse and to
enter into marriage only with their free and full consent." '198
All of this is contingent on how the Canadian State continues to regulate
what has become an almost purely symbolic institution: civil marriage. As the
state now recognizes all of the forms of economic interdependence formally
captured by the institution of marriage (e.g., unmarried cohabitation, constructive
trust, and third party rights and obligations relating to cohabiting spouses),
only residual amounts of light can be seen between civil marriage and unmarried
cohabitation. 9 The gesture of continuing to legislate and regulate civil mar-
197. Quebec is now leading in the direction away from the preference for civil marriage over
unmarried cohabitation. Over 30 per cent of couples in Quebec are in civil unions. This is two-
and-a-half times the rate in other provinces and territories (34.6 per cent in Quebec compared
to 13.4 per cent in the rest of the country). See Milan, V&ina & Wells, supra note 149 at 7.
198. CEDAW, supra note 178, arts. 16(a), (b).
199. Access to the default property regime for marital property is the most significant
remaining difference following Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R.
325 [Walsh]. The constructive trust regime, to which unmarried cohabitants have access
on dissolution of their relationship, approximates the presumption of equal sharing in the
default regime to which married couples have access. However, acquiring a constructive
trust in a cohabitating spouse's assets is a less certain outcome, and the regime provides
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riage would be a purely symbolic tip of the hat to Canada's commitment under
the CEDAW.
Already, arguments have been raised about whether even this bare com-
mitment to civil monogamy can be constitutionally sustained. 2"0 As noted above,
the right to liberty secured under section 7 of the Charter, implicating the fun-
damental liberty to choose which partner one marries-and also how many-
may be in competition with any pressing and substantial objective of clarifying
the status of civil marriage or symbolically entrenching the CEDAW in the
Civil Marriage Act and its bigamy provision.
In any event, the specific harms associated with sexual integrity that are now
voiced in the concerns about a minimum age for, and consent to, valid marriages
are already captured in the prohibitions on sexual exploitation and sexual inter-
ference, as well as by the post-1983 removal from the Criminal Code of marriage
as a defence to sexual assault. All of these offences may indeed be easier to
establish if they are not hidden behind the thick veil of legitimacy and privacy
provided by the institution of marriage. Entrenching a definition of monogamy
for the purposes of both criminal and family law may be merely symbolic, but
its symbolic freight can occlude some of the most pernicious harms that the
entrenchment of the CEDAW in civil and criminal definitions of marriage was
intended to prevent.
Whether or not Parliament were to define civil marriage as monogamous
in both the Civil Marriage Act and the Criminal Code, with the abundance of
means available at Parliament's disposal to meet its legitimate commitment
under the CEDAW-and with regard to the justified concerns about women's
rights that have transformed the landscape of the Canadian family over the last
forty years-the moral perils inherent in the criminalization of polygamy need
to be deeply weighed and re-considered.
more latitude for judicial departure from presumed equality of contribution. As Rollie
Thompson notes in Annotation to Walsh v. Bona (2003), 32 R.F.L. (5th) 87 at 92, "the
law in this area has become more incoherent, inconsistent and unpredictable. Vague tests
of 'juristic reason' and 'direct link' and 'value received/survived' leave much room for
subjective and stereotyped interpretations of roles and contributions." The gap between
the default regime and constructive trusts is one that is felt by women in both
monogamous and polygamous cohabitational relationships.
200. See Bailey etal., supra note 30 at 19ff.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The polygamy charges and the fraught legal history emerging from Bountiful,
British Columbia, have provided us with an opportunity to re-evaluate where we
have stood as a society with respect to plural unions ever since the Criminal
Code first prohibited polygamy in 1892. While this re-appraisal may be taking
place on an informal level, with ordinary Canadians pondering whether and how
their values might accommodate non-monogamous family arrangements, the
formal law must also account for the substratum of values that has shifted over
the last century-and, most particularly, over the last forty years. The socio-
logical shifts of this substratum have been reflected in changes that have been
made in both statutory and case law over this time. It is this latter, legal context
that courts turn to in determining whether or not a standing legal provision is
capable of both providing fair notice to citizens about culpable behaviour and
limiting enforcement discretion, such that this discretion is prevented from
veering towards standardless sweeps. I have argued in this article that the polyg-
amy provision is no longer a constitutionally sustainable piece of legislation.
Decades of family law reform and refinements of the criminal law have
rendered the polygamy provision's harm inscrutable. Religious and other non-
civil marriages have long been reduced to civil nullities by the state. When Canada
passed its first divorce act in 1968, it assumed universal jurisdiction over divorce,
allowing those in religiously indissoluble marriages to re-marry civilly as long as
their prior civil marriage was dissolved. Prior existing religious marriages were
no longer regarded as lawful impediments to civil marriage, and neither were
they considered forms of marriage or conjugal unions for the purposes of the
polygamy provision.
Changes in marriage and divorce law were accompanied by a transforma-
tion in social attitudes towards unmarried cohabitation. A couple living together
for a duration sufficient to raise four children (as in Tolhurst and Wright) were
not considered to be living in a conjugal union for the purposes of the polygamy
provision in 1937. Indeed, neither were their unions otherwise recognized for
the benefit of family law. Formal marriage was considered to be the significant
social and legal event of the time. Sixty years later, functional conjugality-the
nexus of spouse-like activities in which a cohabiting couple engage-sets the
threshold for almost as many of the resources of family law as marriage itself.
Meanwhile, the content of the institution of marriage has become more fluid
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and diverse. Commensurately, the content of the pivotal concept in the polygamy
provision-conjugality-has become fluid and open-ended to the point of
having no legal meaning at all.
Throughout these developments and, indeed, long before polygamy was
prohibited in 1892, male sexual infidelity has not been regarded as a perilous
foray over the edge of monogamy and into the territory of polygamy. The
polygamy section's own case law tolerates the conjunction of monogamous
marriage and adultery, even adultery of an extended duration and with the re-
sult of multiple children. More recently, swinging and other forms of polyamory
have found their place alongside other forms of coupling, and these activities
have been regarded in law as, minimally, not indecent.
Given the range of behaviours and arrangements that the law views as
consistent with monogamy, it has become increasingly difficult to decipher the
specific harm that the polygamy provision is intended to thwart. Enough for-
mal and functional exceptions have been carved out of the section to cover just
about every form of human coupling. As a result, the section has been left
hanging, and is vulnerable to the charge that it should now be considered void
for vagueness and an unconstitutional violation of the right to life, liberty, and
security of the person.
Beyond the unconstitutionality of the provision, and in light of over a cen-
tury's worth of tolerances, the prosecution of particular plural unions appears to
court both legal incoherence and social hypocrisy. Worse, the singling out of
minority groups for practices that are functionally no different from what the
majority population has tolerated and accommodated over the last century leaves
the polygamy provision poised to trigger concerns about xenophobia and racism.
Such concerns have grounding in the discriminatory way that that provision
was originally formulated and subsequently invoked.
The social, legal, and constitutional deficiencies of the polygamy provision
will be weighed against concerns about vulnerable family members in plural
arrangements. This article has argued that these latter considerations do not out-
weigh the perils of the ongoing criminalization of polygamy. Concerns about
the vulnerabilities of women and children that have, to a large extent, driven
the reforms of family law over the last four decades were lamentably absent
from the polygamy provision's first sixty years in the Criminal Code. These
concerns remain pressing for women in Canadian society at large, not just for
women and children in unconventional family arrangements. Both the amplitude
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and the paucity of legal and social resources for vulnerable family members fall
indiscriminately on women in both monogamous and polygamous unions.
Ultimately, the conjunction of the polygamy section's inscrutability with
its tendency to allow for selective targeting of minority groups has rendered
the section suspect and unworthy of the Canadian tradition of reasonable
accommodation of difference. If Canadian law needs some adjustments to
ensure that all women, including those in polygamous unions, have equal access
to the concrete securities that make our options tangible and attainable-
providing us with the most robust exercise of the agency that Canadian society
is able to offer-then that should be done in a manner that does not single out
religious, social, and political minorities for a singular form of scrutiny, discipline,
persecution, and paranoia.

